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I. Introduction 
"You’re not risking human life to get a great shot. In an era where TV news is losing its 
audience to bloggers and other Internet sources drones can cheaply and easily obtain 
video images that only incredibly expensive helicopters could previously cover. . . . 
Drones for Electronic News Gathering or ENG will become routine.3 
A small UAS costing between $30,000 and $50,000 is more likely to be purchased by 
state and local law enforcement entities because the cost is nearly equivalent to that of a 
patrol car.”4 
Science fiction, or is the beast already upon us? 
                                                 
3  TV Stations to start using military drones, http://rt.com/usa/military-drone-law-news-444/ (Sept. 5, 
2012) (quoting Snaproll’s Preston Ryon). Snaproll Media equips drones with state-of-the-art digital movie 
cameras http://snaprollmedia.com/ 
4   http://cnsnews.com/news/article/faa-has-authorized-106-government-entities-fly-domestic-drones 
(reporting on Congressional testimony by Governmental Accountability Office). 
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Drones are well beyond science fiction, as hundreds of dead leaders of al Queda in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East could testify—if they were still alive.5 What 
the armed forces and intelligence agencies do halfway around the world, however, does 
not mean that the same thing is inevitable on U.S. soil. It reveals something about 
technological capabilities, but it does not reflect the factors that will shape business and 
political decisionmaking in the U.S. 
What is clear is that that drone technology is evolving rapidly and that microdrones—
what the FAA calls “sUAS”—already have the capability to supplement manned 
helicopters6 in support of public safety operations, news reporting, and powerline and 
pipeline patrol. Microdrones weighing five pounds or less and priced at the $1,000 level 
are on the market now.7 They can provide crucial support in circumstances where 
manned helicopter support is infeasible, untimely, or unsafe. They could fly short range 
missions at heights and in proximity to targets that would be too dangerous for manned 
helicopters. Indeed, they are flying such missions now in Europe and other parts of the 
world. But their deployment, even for testing and demonstration, is not practicable in 
the United States because of the FAA’s sluggish implementation of its Congressionally 
mandated plan to integrate drones in the national airspace.  
Larger drones–"machodrones”–are not yet available outside battlefield and 
counterterrorism spaces. Approximating the size of manned helicopters, but without 
                                                 
5 The FY 2012 inventory ranges from the Navy’s 44,600-pound aerial combat X-47B and the Air 
Force/Navy 14,900 pound Global Hawk to the Army’s 4.2-pound, hand-launched Raven. DOD, Report to 
Congress on Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability (April 2012), 
(RefID:7-3C47E5F) at p.2. In 2010 the Air Force had 192 drones, the Army 364, the Navy 15, and the 
Marine Corps 28, in addition to some 6,200 small unmanned aircraft, which require less support. 
Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Table 1 at p.6 (March 2010), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/uas2010.pdf. 
6 Rotary wing drones have the distinct advantage over fixed-wing drones that they do not need a 
specially prepared place to operate from. In addition, depending on their basic design, they may have 
much simplified control systems.  See § XXX Accordingly, the article focuses on rotary wing drones 
instead of fixed wing drones. 
7 Assessing the impact of drones requires differentiating between two kinds: “microdrones”—what the 
FAA calls “sUAS,” and machodrones, larger unmanned aircraft intended to be integrated into the flow of 
manned aircraft. Microdrones, hard to distinguish from model helicopters, are already widely available; 
only FAA restrictions on “commercial use” (See § XXX) have slowed their productive deployment. The 
University of Missouri's Drone Journalism program suffered a setback when the FAA told it to stop 
flying its drones on news gathering missions until it obtained a Certificate of Authorization. 
http://www.missouridronejournalism.com/Is this science fiction or aviation’s future?. 
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pilots, or with human pilots being optional, their design is still in its infancy as 
designers await greater clarity in the regulatory requirements that will drive 
airworthiness certification. 
This article evaluates drone technology and design and considers how well existing and 
likely drone capabilities satisfy mission requirements. It draws upon the authors’ 
collective experience in flying news helicopters, giving helicopter flight instruction, 
practicing and teaching law, flying drug surveillance mission, evaluating best practices 
for helicopter support for public safety activities, and in aeronautical engineering. 
It concentrates on electronic news gathering,8 law-enforcement support,9. and pipeline 
and powerline patrol because these activities are most likely to benefit from drone 
operations. 
Its analysis and conclusions with respect to microdrones are supported by empirical 
results obtained from a series of flight tests of currently available microdrones. Its 
assessment of machodrone deployment necessarily is more speculative. There, it 
explains the engineering design process and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing technologies, compared with likely regulatory requirements. 
It concludes that the ready availability of microdrones will tempt users to deploy them 
even before their operational use is legal. If the FAA wants to achieve its goal of 
managing the introduction of these new flight technologies into the national airspace 
system safely, it must accelerate the regulatory process and do a better job of matching 
regulatory requirements with mission reality and likely aircraft characteristics. 
Integration of machodrones will take longer, and the FAA has more time to work with 
stakeholders to evolve a framework to test the limits of remote control technologies as 
                                                 
8  See generally David Goldberg et al, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems and Journalism: Opportunities 
and Challenges of Drones in News Gathering, 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Working_Papers/Remotely_Pi
loted_Aircraft_and_Journalism.pdf (June 2013) [hereinafter "Reuters Report"] 
9  These two uses are similar in many respects: the nature of the flight profiles--relatively low and 
relatively stationary—the equipment required--high-definition cameras with, for law-enforcement, 
infrared imaging capability--and the use of a pilot and a sensor monitor--usually called a Tactical Flght 
Officer (“TFO") in law-enforcement, and a photojournalist, usually abbreviated to "photog," in 
newsgathering. The capability to supplement or supplant these manned helicopter uses are similar for 
both industry sectors 
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substitutes for pilots in the cockpit.10 The main question here is not whether the FAA 
will be able to channel technology, but whether the ultimate cost and capabilities of 
machodrones will make them attractive to purchasers and operators and whether actual 
vehicles will be able to compete with manned helicopters. 
The article begins with an exploration of drone technology and what it suggests about 
drone design. It describes law-enforcement and newsgathering missions that could be 
performed with existing designs—if FAA regulations permitted it—and then probes 
particular technology developments that would enhance such missions. 
It then moves to consider legal restrictions, focusing particularly on the FAA’s 
Congressionally mandated effort to adapt its regulations to permit drones to be 
integrated into the National Airspace System, concluding with a projection of when 
different kinds of operations will be permitted. These regulatory initiatives necessarily 
are intertwined with further technology development, and this relationship is 
considered in some detail. 
It concludes with projections about the likely future of drones, considering supply chain 
factors, labor markets, and politics. 
II. Possibilities  
Aircraft design, like politics, is the art of the possible. But even more than politics, 
aircraft design is the art of making trade-offs. Howard Hughes build the impressive 
“Spruce Goose”—an eight-engine wooden aircraft intended to serve World War II 
transatlantic logistics needs, but it was unable to fly out of ground effect—higher than 
70 feet.11 
Trade-offs, like what is possible, are a function of the technologies available when the 
design decisions are made. Technologies change. The question in the background for 
any aircraft design is how many past design decisions should be revisited. Usually, the 
answer is, "not many." Empirical results and customer acceptance are well-established 
for existing designs, and airworthiness certification is far less demanding when a 
                                                 
10  Now, drones are flown with an operator—what the article refers to as a “DROP.” In the future, drones 
will be flown on their own. See § ___. 
11  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hughes_H-4_Hercules 
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proponent approaches the FAA with a modification of an existing design rather than 
something completely new. 
Sometimes new mission concepts lead to completely new designs, as the need for high-
altitude reconnaissance led to the U-2, the need for intercontinental ballistic missiles to 
deliver multiple independently retargetable warheads led to inertial guidance systems, 
and the goal putting a man on the moon led to the multistage Saturn rocket with a small 
orbiter payload. 
Other times, the practicability of new technologies causes people to dream up new 
missions. The helicopter, which first became practicable after World War II, is an 
example. It caused people to think, "what could we do if we didn't need runways and 
could remain stationary in the air?" 
In a market economy, neither the new-mission-invites-new-design nor new-
technologies-inspire-new-missions process is unidirectional. Engineers and 
entrepreneurs come up with new design ideas all the time. Operators go shopping for 
systems that can perform new missions. When their ideas resonate with each other, 
something new happens, and the market either accepts or rejects it. 
Sometimes the mission-driven process prevails; at other times the technology-driven 
process prevails. 
In the worlds of law-enforcement and ENG, mission will drive design for machodrones, 
and technology will inspire new missions for microdrones. 
Mission profiles for law-enforcement support and for ENG are well-established and 
well-accepted by the decision-makers of both communities. Neither police departments 
nor TV stations are fired up about redefining their air-support missions. Accordingly, 
one part of growing revolution will be shaped by interest in having drones to do pretty 
much what police and ENG helicopters do now. ENG machodrones would look similar 
to current ENG helicopters. Microdrones lack the capability to support that kind of 
ENG.12 The news industry has certain expectations of news gathering helicopters, like 
speed and capability. ENG drone performance would need to be similar to existing 
ENG helicopters. Likewise, the law-enforcement community is comfortable with its 
existing helicopter designs, which look very much like ENG helicopters. 
                                                 
12 Camera equipment weights would disqualify microdrones from the  ENG world. Current ENG 
helicopters are deployed with 200-400 pounds of ENG equipment. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, however, for both law-enforcement and ENG, the new 
microdrone technologies will stimulate the development of new kinds of missions. 
The following sections survey the technologies most relevant to law-enforcement 
support and ENG, identifying developments that can enable new design tradeoffs. Then 
they consider the interplay between mission and design with respect to machodrones 
and microdrones. A final section discusses purely autonomous drones. 
A. Technologies 
Designing an air vehicle that excludes people opens up design constraints that 
historically have driven size, weight and power requirements. Now, the long-standing 
debate over the relative merits of man versus unmanned spaceflight is moving to 
aviation more generally. It raises the question: how can aircraft be flown safety from the 
ground, with no one actually aboard? To do that requires sensory input for the DROP 
(DRone Operator) roughly similar to what a pilot in the cockpit has and some robust 
link between the DROP and the aircraft.  
One engineer says to a colleague, “We got a helicopter that weighs 2200 pounds. What 
happens if we don’t need to have the pilot and the photog onboard? They’ll stay on the 
ground.” 
“That gives us another 400 pounds of payload.” 
“Wait a minute? Why was it this big in the first place?” 
“To carry the people and to carry the fuel 
“But if we don't have the people, we don't need as much fuel. What could it do if we 
scale it way down, as much as by a factor of a hundred or a thousand?” 
And so the design chase is on. 
The following subsections consider the technologies central to this reconfiguration: 
electric propulsion of lighter vehicles, design of DROP ground stations, and the wireless 
links between vehicle and DROP.  
1. Electric powerplants 
Manned helicopters must be big enough and have enough power to carry a human 
pilot. Unmanned helicopters can be much smaller. At smaller sizes, electric propulsion 
systems become practicable. Multiple rotors can be driven by small electric motors. 
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Their thrust can be varied by changing RPM13 rather than changing the pitch of the 
blades, thus eliminating the complexity of pitch-change mechanisms.  
Electrical propulsion systems are desirable because they simplify drive-train and 
control-system requirements and features14 Electrical propulsion systems do not require 
mechanical gearboxes or mechanical shafts, all of which are sources of energy loss in 
piston engine or turbine powered aircraft. Instead, appropriately sized wires transfer 
electrical power from battery or generator to electric motors powering the rotors. In 
addition, because electrical motors have more favorable torque output over a wide 
range of RPM, rotor thrust can be varied efficiently by changing RPM, obviating the 
need for blade-pitch variation, as explained more fully in § XXX. 
For these reasons, electrical propulsion systems predominate in microdrones. The main 
reason electrical component propulsion systems are not in wider use in manned aircraft 
and in larger drones is battery weight. 
2. Control systems  
Well-trained human beings are extremely good at integrating very fine and rapidly 
changing sensory inputs and responding appropriately, as anyone knows who can fly a 
helicopter—or play tennis, golf, or the piano. Robots have been around for a long time 
but it is only recently that robotics have gained the capability to replicate very fine 
human coordination.15 
Designing systems for controlling aircraft from the ground requires attention to three 
cooperating subsystems: the ground control station, the subsystems aboard the aircraft 
for collecting data that otherwise would be sensed directly by the pilot and for applying 
his control inputs to hardware on the aircraft, and connecting the two. Each influences 
the others. For example a high resolution video display for the DROP does not assist 
him in flying unless cameras aboard the aircraft feed the displays with the requisite 
                                                 
13  The torque available from piston and turbine engines peaks at a particular RPM and falls off sharply at 
higher and lower RPMs. See http://www.epi-eng.com/piston_engine_technology/power_and_torque.htm 
(explaining why torque falls off at lower and higher RPMs in piston engines, and providing graphs). The 
torque available from an electric motor is greatest at zero RPM and falls off gradually as RPM increases, 
over a much wider RPM range than for piston and turbine engines. See 
http://www.fastelectrics.com/elecmotorbasics.htm. 
14  See § XXX for a fuller explanation of control system simplification. 
15  CITE athleticism video 
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high-definition imagery. Even if the DROP is highly skilled in responding to sensory 
inputs, his fine control movements have to get back to the aircraft quickly and change 
its flight orientation. 
The following subsections consider the ground station, the onboard data collection 
subsystem and the link. Little attention is paid to translating pilot control inputs to the 
hardware because that is already done in most aircraft to some extent, and the same 
system would be used in drones. Any aircraft has a means for translating the control 
inputs received from the human operator into mechanical forces applied control 
surfaces--to the pitch rods for the main and tail rotors in helicopters. The same means 
used in simple systems to reduce pilot effort or in more sophisticated autopilots for 
manned helicopters are a straightforward way to do this. Servo mechanisms are 
installed on each control.16 
a) "Cockpit” design 
If the analysis in this article is correct, that DROPs will need visual information 
comparable, insofar as practicable, to what they would have if they were in the cockpit. 
One can envision a ground station layout with a multiplicity of high definition video 
screens that provide real-time imagery captured from multiple cameras on the drone. 
The images on the screens would replicate a field of view roughly 270° laterally and 90° 
up and down 
The biggest concern is whether, even with high-definition cameras on the drone and 
wraparound video displays at the console, the DROP will be able to see as much as he 
                                                 
16   "[A] servo system involves the control of power by some means or other involving a comparison of 
the output of the controlled power and the actuating device. This comparison is sometimes referred to as 
feedback." I. A. Getting, Servo Systems, http://www.jlab.org/ir/MITSeries/V25.PDF (basic explanation of 
different types of servo systems). 
In a typical remotely controlled model helicopter, for example, a small electric motor rotates or otherwise 
moves a shaft to a position set by the user and holds it there until the user commands a different position. 
How to Choose the Right Servos for your RC Helicopters, http://www.rchelicopter.com/category/rc-
helicopter-servos/. The source of power--the actuator--can be hydraulic as well as electrical, and typically 
is on larger, manned helicopters.  
The Piccolo II is a 7.7 ounce avionics package that offers a full-featured automatic pilot and datalink 
channels for drones. 
https://www.cloudcaptech.com/Sales%20and%20Marketing%20Documents/Piccolo%20II%20Data%20She
et.pdf 
10 
 
could if he were in the cockpit. Ensuring adequate field of view is possible with the 
multiplicity of cameras and video screens. Zoom lenses theoretically would give him 
greater visual acuity, but it takes longer to zoom a lens, even with the best human-
factors design, than it does to swivel your head and focus on a particular object. 
Providing depth perception, however, is a challenge without an obvious solution. 
Depth perception is important in spotting other traffic. For example, the FAA’s 
standards for pilot medical certificates requires depth perception, even in pilots with 
serious visual deficiencies in one eye.17 Depth perception is not possible with even the 
best two-dimensional image produced by the best monocular camera. 3-D movie and 
medical technology might address the depth perception problem.18  
The complexity of two cameras, however, shooting each angle with just the right aiming 
points and fields of view would complicate the sensors on the drone and would be 
collateral to mission equipment. They would be necessary only for control and traffic 
separation. So this would represent weight and power consumption unnecessary on a 
manned helicopter. Likewise, the DROP might find it cumbersome to wear 3-D goggles 
to look at his display.  
In addition, the human perceptual apparatus has the capacity instantly to focus and 
concentrate on a particular object within the field of view. Cameras, of course, can pan 
and zoom, but they cannot do it as quickly as a human can focus his visual 
concentration.19 The latency in image shift is a function of the DROP having to move a 
mechanical controller of some kind, plus the time required for servomotors in the 
                                                 
17  See generally 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/ame/guide/app_process/exa
m_tech/et/31-34/mv/ 
18 Research on laproscopic surgery using two-dimensional flat-panel displays compared with three-
dimensional simulation with da Vinci cameras and polarizing glasses showed significant improvements 
in performance times and surgeon satisfaction with the 3-D simulation. It also showed, however, that 
experienced surgeons use monocular cues to compensate for lack of depth perception, including motion 
parallax by shifting the camera, relative position and size of instruments and anatomical structures, and 
shading of light and dark. Kazushi Tanaka, et al.,  Evaluation of a 3D system based on a high-quality flat 
screen and polarized glasses for use by surgical assistants during robotic surgery, 30(1) Indian J. Urol. 13 
(2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3897045/. 
19  If the video display available to the DROP exactly replicates what he could see from the cockpit, he can 
use this perceptual flexibility just as he could in the cockpit. 
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camera to respond, plus latency in the connection. Even in hardwired systems, such as 
those installed in ENG helicopters, the latency is appreciable. It will be even greater 
when the video camera control inputs must traverse the uplink, depending on the 
bandwidth of the uplink and computer processing time on both ends. 
Empirical work should precede any commitment to 3-D photography or any conclusion 
that there is a serious inherent problem with providing good visual information to the 
DROP.  
b) Cameras 
Law-enforcement support and ENG depend on good imagery. Accordingly, drones 
must be equipped with stabilized video camera similar to those installed on Electronic 
News Gathering (“ENG”) helicopters.20 These camera systems have gimbaled mounts to 
neutralize helicopter vibration, and servo motors that permit quick changes in azimuth 
and elevation relative to the helicopter’s heading, and quick zooming. 
The FAA plans for drone integration into the NAS reinforce this need. As § XXX 
explains, traffic separation in the National Airspace System depends on a see-and-avoid 
philosophy. This is not likely to change until well after 2020. That means that DROPs 
must have real-time video imagery captured from the drone—and it must be good 
imagery. 
But one camera is not going to be enough. A human pilot has a nearly 180-degree 
horizontal field of view--95% away from the nose on each side--and 60-degrees upward. 
With eyeball rotation (but no head inclination or rotation), the horizontal field increases 
to almost 270 degrees.21 He can shift his field of view in an instant by rotating and 
inclining his eyes and turning his head.  
Replicating this visual perspective for the DROP is challenging. It will require multiple 
cameras, as many as five, one pointing forward, one pointing left, one pointing right, 
                                                 
20  For example the FLIR Ultramedia HD system contains a Sony HDC-1500 camera, a 3-chip, 2/3-inch 
CCD device. It has 2.2 effective megapixels and 14-bit bit depth. The greater bit depth, compared with 
HDR-AS10 consumer camera, permits greater precision in representing the brightness of each color. A 
competing product from Cineflex, uses the Sony HDC-2400 camera. See http://www.cineflex.com/Our-
Products/Cineflex-Media 
21  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_eye#Field_of_view 
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one pointing up, and one pointing down, and a multiplicity of display screens arranged 
so that the DROP can see what he would see from the cockpit. 
Infrared imagery, in addition to color imagery, is desirable for law-enforcement 
applications but not for ENG applications. Infrared imaging equipment is not presently 
available for microdrones. For full-sized manned helicopters, infrared equipment 
weighs on the order of 100 pounds and consumes about 350 watts of electrical power.22 
Night vision equipment may be more necessary for a DROP to fly a drone at night than 
for a pilot in a helicopter cockpit. Even the best cameras have limitations on low-light 
image capture, compared with the human eye. If the camera cannot capture an image, 
the DROP cannot see it on his screens. Night vision equipment may be desirable for 
law-enforcement applications, but it is not relevant to ENG operations, unless news 
organizations develop a demand, not yet evident, for night-vision photography. 
Any useful drone must have transceivers and antenna systems to downlink video 
imagery. The weight of such systems currently on the market for manned helicopters is 
about five pounds23 and falling. 
The technology for video imaging is changing rapidly, fueled in large part by consumer 
demand for lighter, higher-resolution cameras, that are sparing of battery power. It is 
certain that the weight, cost, and power consumption of camera for law-enforcement 
and ENG will fall dramatically over the next several years. 
c) High-bandwidth wireless data links 
Because drones do not have a human pilot onboard, they must have a data link capable 
of transferring information about the drone’s position and flight profile down to the 
DROP and of transferring control inputs up to the drone. 
Remote control of flight vehicles is not a new undertaking. Space probes fly to Mars and 
collect samples on the ground;24 deep-space probes penetrate the outer reaches of the 
galaxy, sending photography back to Earth.25 None of these activities can be successful 
                                                 
22  http://gs.flir.com/uploads/file/products/brochures/star_safire_380-hd_a_ltr.pdf 
23  http://www.trollsystems.com/images/Troll_DataSheetsPDF/SkyLinkMINI_2_DataSheet.pdf 
24  National Geographic, Mars Exploration, http://science.nationalgeographic.com/science/space/space-
exploration/mars-exploration-article/ (describing Mars exploration by unmanned vehicles). 
25  See NASA, Voyager: the Interstellar Mission, http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/ 
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without robust control links and other data links.26 In comparison to the demands of 
space-vehicle-control technology, the requirements for terrestrial drones is modest—
well within the capabilities of existing technology.27 
Such data links comprise radio transceivers on the ground and in the drone operating 
on the same frequency, using compatible modulation 28 schemes and exchanging 
compatible data structures.  
Data-link design involves determining frequencies, transmitter power, receiver 
sensitivity, and standardizing data structures29 so that the transmitting and receiving 
units can understand each other. Depending on the distance from the DROP to the 
drone, relay stations may be necessary. 
Each end of the link listens continuously to the other.30 The sending side sends the 
pertinent data structures over and over again, with changed values if the operator has 
moved one of the controls, or the drone has changed position. 
A variety of things can happen to corrupt or interrupt the data link. A burst of static 
from a lightning strike can cause a bit to be missed or a bit to be inserted. Another radio 
                                                 
26 See NASA, Basics of Space Flight, Section II, chap. 10, http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/basics/bsf10-1.php 
(describing frequencies, signal strength, coding, modulation, and ground and airborne equipoment); 
NASA, Basics of Space Flight, Section II, chap. 11, http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/basics/bsf11-2.php 
(describing typical onboard systems). See also Space Today Online, NASA's Deep Space Network, 
http://www.spacetoday.org/SolSys/DeepSpaceNetwork/DeepSpaceNetwork.html (generally describing 
network for communicating with space systems); Nature, Laser telemetry from space (26 July 2002), 
http://www.nature.com/news/2002/020726/full/news020722-8.html (describing how the demands of high-
quality video from space probes threaten to overwhelm available radio bandwidth). 
27  Obstructions to line of sight are not a problem, however, for space communications. Unmanned space 
vehicles also can tolerate much lower data rates in the control link, because they, unlike terrestrial drones, 
do not need to maneuver quickly. That means that the bandwidth required of drone datalinks is higher 
than that required for space communications. 
28  Modulation is the combination of information with a basic radio signal, known as a carrier. 
29 Data structure is the term used by computer scientists to refer to standard ways of exchanging 
information between computers or between different parts of the same computer system. The data 
structure for positional information transmitted to the DROP by a drone might have altitude in the first 
field, latitude in the second field, longitude in the third field, and so on. Each field must be defined in 
terms of its length, and in terms of how the information is coded. The data structure for commands 
transmitted by the DROP to the drone could have collective position in the first field, cyclic longitudinal 
position in the second field, cyclic lateral position in the third field, and yaw position in the fourth. 
30  It does this by programming the computer algorithm on each end to run in the loop. It looks for new 
information, then processes it, and then asks for new information again. 
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signal on or near the data-link frequency for the drone can overpower the drone control 
signal. 
When this happens, both ends of the data link must have a strategy for reestablishing 
communication if possible. They might step back for a short time interval and restart, 
looking for the beginning of a packet, in an attempt to resynchronize. Or, if it seems 
hopeless to reestablish the link, the drone should go into an autonomous state and 
perform some maneuver that ensures safety, such as climbing to improve line-of-sight 
signal reception, or autonomously returning to “home.” 
Datalinks can be encrypted for security, using well understood and widely available 
encryption algorithms. 
As drone use becomes widespread, and as the demand for higher quality video 
increases, the limitations on available radio spectrum will become a constraint. Wireless 
spectrum is already crowded with voice and data communications related to manned 
aircraft operation. Widespread drone use will crowd spectrum further, although the 
FAA Roadmap assumes, "8. Communications spectrum is available to support UAS 
operations.” 
Most microdrones presently assign both their controlling and video downlink 
frequencies to the unlicensed Wi-Fi bands. The availability of spectrum is not likely to 
be a problem as long as only one drone as flying within the range of the Wi-Fi 
transceivers on the drone in the DROP station. 
But it will not be long before multiple drones are flying in the vicinity of a public safety 
incident or newsworthy event, which in turn may be located in an area where multiple 
residents and businesses are using Wi-Fi in their ordinary activities. In such a situation, 
frequency congestion will occur, degrading performance for everyone and possibly 
interfering with effective drone control. 
The wider use of drones will stress spectrum availability only if it stimulates more 
demand for aviation support of law enforcement and newsgathering. If the total 
amount of video downlink--the biggest user of spectrum--remains about the same as 
collected by manned helicopters now, supplemented by drone-collected video, – video 
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downlink spectrum requirements will not increase. The spectrum requirements for 
control links and ADS-B Out31 are relatively modest.  
3. Autonomous drone flight 
In the near to medium term, drones will be piloted, in the sense that they will be 
controlled by a DROP at a ground facility who has essentially the same sensory inputs 
that he would have if he were aboard, and who has controls and makes control inputs 
similar to those he would have if he were aboard. 
Technology permits drones to be autonomous: to fly some or all of their missions 
without a DROP.32 The boundary between autonomous and piloted is not dichotomous: 
current microdrones, for example, have autopilots that are capable of hovering without 
operator input, and many of them have a return-to-home feature that permits them to 
navigate back to the launching point if the control link is lost. At the other end of the 
autonomy spectrum, even if a drone is authorized to fly most of its mission 
autonomously, a DROP might make the takeoff and landing or might fly certain parts 
of mission. 
Already on the market are microdrones such as the ARDrone2.0 elite, costing well 
under $1000,33 which have the capability to fly from waypoint to waypoint, 
programmed by the DROP on a movable map, using familiar GPS mapping capability. 
With software currently available, the DROP can assign altitudes for each waypoint, 
direct the drone to hover or orbit at particular waypoints, and then to return to the 
launching point. 
An autonomous drone assigned to a law-enforcement formation, for example, could be 
programmed to fly a grid or more complicated patterns of particular streets in 
particular parts of the city, sending imagery back to a DROP and DROTFO. A drone 
assigned to a search-and-rescue mission could be automatically programmed to fly a 
standard search grid. In either case, the DROP and DROSOP could concentrate their 
energies on looking for anomalous situations that might indicate the target of a search 
effort or criminal activity rather than flying the aircraft. 
                                                 
31 See § XXX. 
32 The FAA Roadmap says, "7. Autonomous operations are not permitted.” It defines autonomous 
operations as any system design that precludes any person from affecting the normal operations of the 
aircraft." Roadmap at 33-34. 
33  See § ___ for an analysis of microdrones now on the market. 
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Possible roles for of autonomous drones in newsgathering is less clear. ENG helicopters, 
unlike police helicopters, do not engage in routine patrol according to predictable 
patterns; they fly ad-hoc to cover newsworthy events. It is conceivable, however, that 
autonomous drones could be programmed to fly traffic surveillance. 
The implications of greater autonomy on performance, safety, and acceptance are hard 
to predict with any confidence. Labor costs would not necessarily be reduced, because it 
is quite unlikely safety considerations would permit an autonomous drone to operate 
without close human monitoring and control by personnel having the same skills 
required for non-autonomous operations. Autonomous drones will engender more 
opposition because of the perception that a human pilot can deal with an unanticipated 
problems better than an autopilot. Indeed, only an anticipated problem and be 
programmed into autopilot software. And, the greater capabilities of the software and 
the electronics necessary to perform autonomous missions safely undoubtedly will 
increase weight, cost, and power consumption. 
B. Matching mission and design 
Conventional mission concepts for law enforcement and ENG will drive design for 
machodrones, while new technologies will inspire new missions for microdrones. 
The central thesis of this article is that microdrones will be deployed in support of 
newsgathering, law-enforcement, and pipeline/powerline patrol activities long before 
machodrones will be available or cost effective. Machodrones face a much more 
arduous regulatory regime, considered in more detail in Part XXX, and the result of 
meeting regulatory requirements will drive up their price and limit their operational 
flexibility. Machodrones intended for civilian use have not been designed or built yet. 
Microdrones capable of performing useful missions, on the other hand, are already 
available. While current regulatory requirements for their commercial use presently are 
cumbersome and, in some respects, irrational, the FAA projects near-term relaxation of 
the requirements. 
The next two sections analyze designs and mission capabilities for the two basic 
categories of drones. Because machodrones are not yet available, the section on them 
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probes the design process more deeply than the section on microdrones, utilizing basic 
aerodynamic principles and rules of thumb, and speculating about cost.34 
1. Microdrone 
Microdrones provide an example of new technologies driving new mission concepts. 
The point is not the microtones can do the same job that manned helicopters can. They 
cannot. But they can supplement helicopters.  
Microdrones capable of useful missions already exist. The authors have flown two of 
them for educational purposes. The first, the Phantom 2 Vision,35 is a quadcopter36 with 
battery life of about a half hour that flies as high as 500 feet at 30-35 knots. Priced at 
$1,200, it weighs about 2.5 pounds, and has a built-in high-definition video camera that 
is controllable in elevation by the operator, using an iPhone. The operator can see 
camera imagery while he flies, and download the video recording while in-flight or 
after the vehicle lands.37 The aircraft also has an autopilot that keeps it stable in a hover 
when the operator makes no control inputs. If the control link is lost, the aircraft 
automatically flies back to its point of departure on that flight and lands.38 The second is 
the Parrot AR.Drone2.0.39 It weighs less than a pound and has endurance of 15-25 
minutes. 
                                                 
34  One rule of thumb, for example, says that one horsepower is required for each 10 to 25 pounds of 
weight, and that the figure of merit is 60 to 80%. The figure of merit is a parameter used in helicopter 
design to represent the percentage of engine shaft power reflected in rotor torque. Sometimes the figure 
of merit includes gearbox losses; sometimes it excludes them. 
These figures are validated by the descriptive facts for the Robinson R22 Beta II, which has a maximum 
gross weight of 1370 pounds, and a maximum continuous power rating of 124 HP. For a FOM of 60%, the 
weight per unit of power is 18.4; for a ROM of 80%, the weight per unit of power is 13.8, both well within 
the range of 10-25 pounds per unit of horsepower. 
35  http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision/ 
36  A quadcopter is a rotorcraft with four main rotors, obviating the need for a tail rotor. 
37  A significant advantage of the AR over the Phantom is that the AR offers the option for streaming its 
high-definition video to the iPad control station, where it is automatically recorded. To obtain the video 
captured by the Phantom camera, one must download it from the chip after the Phantom lands. 
38  The co-authors have flown the Phantom 2 Vision for some 10 to 15 hours and confirmed its advertised 
capabilities. The camera does not have azimuth control, nor does it have a zooming lens, but there's no 
reason to believe that these features will not be added in future models or offered in competing products. 
39  http://ardrone2.parrot.com/ 
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Based on their experience with the Phantom and the AR and an analysis of what is 
available to the international market,40 the authors commissioned, through their drone 
R&D firm,41 the design and construction of XXX, a microdrone they they will use for 
recreational and educational purposes until FAA approval is obtained for more formal 
commercial flight testing. 
The basic design has a lightweight carbon fibre body sized to accommodate upgrades. 
The flight control system has a magnetometer and GPS tracking. The basic design has 
four pods and a quadcopter design, intended eventually to become an octocopter, with 
four additional motors and motors installed on the same pods that have the initial four. 
It has range capabilities greater than the Phantom or AR, GPS, FPV, and Bluetooth for 
Ipad support. It also has a built in IOC (Intelligent Orientation Control) to avoid control 
reversal as the orientation of the drone changes. It is designed eventually to achieve 
close to an hour’s endurance, speeds in the 40-50 knot range and service ceilings up to 
1,000 feet.  
                                                 
40  The Aerialtronics Altura , www.aerialtronics.nl/en/products/altura,  is a larger entry, with a gross 
weight approaching 10 pounds, endurance of up to 50 minutes, with a correspondingly larger payload. It 
is configured as a hybrid between a quadcopter and an octocopter, with two rotors on each hub. Dutch in 
origin, it is being marketed in Europe, but not yet in the United States. Some European vendors quote a 
price of €8,000 (about $11,000). The IRIS Custom "Spec Ops" Package,  
http://shop.aeroworksproductions.com/IRIS-Custom-Spec-Ops-Package-ISpecOps.htm. priced at $1,669, 
offers longer endurance, approaching an hour, and flexibility to configure according to user 
requirements, for example, by installing different cameras in the gimbal system. The 3DR Y6 Copter ARF 
(Special Order)  http://shop.aeroworksproductions.com/3DR-Y6-Copter-ARF-Special-Order-3DRY6.htm. 
priced at $1,100 offers lower endurance, but flexibility in GPS waypoint autonomy. The Turbo Ace X830-
D RTF (one of several options http://www.wowhobbies.com/turboacex830-
dquadcopterrtfwdevo10rx1002gps4x35aescandbrushlessmotorsmgpower5300mah3s35cbatterytxbatteryc
x-b601strap.aspx, priced at $1,297, offers flight times of up to 30 minutes and payloads approximating 
two pounds. The IRIS Custom "Spec Ops" Package,  http://shop.aeroworksproductions.com/IRIS-Custom-
Spec-Ops-Package-ISpecOps.htm. priced at $1,669, offers longer endurance, approaching an hour, and 
flexibility to configure according to user requirements, for example, by installing different cameras in the 
gimbal system. The 3DR Y6 Copter ARF (Special Order)  http://shop.aeroworksproductions.com/3DR-Y6-
Copter-ARF-Special-Order-3DRY6.htm. priced at $1,100 offers lower endurance, but flexibility in GPS 
waypoint autonomy. The Turbo Ace X830-D RTF (one of several options 
http://www.wowhobbies.com/turboacex830-
dquadcopterrtfwdevo10rx1002gps4x35aescandbrushlessmotorsmgpower5300mah3s35cbatterytxbatteryc
x-b601strap.aspx, priced at $1,297, offers flight times of up to 30 minutes and payloads approximating 
two pounds. 
41  www.movoaviation.com. 
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It has a fixed FPV camera mounting point, and a built-in 12V regulator to power FPV 
equipment and a gimbal. It also offers room for additional mission equipment such as 
higher quality video camera, FPV gear, OSD, sonar sensors, telemetry radios, and 
infrared cameras. and other devices. Bolt-on mounting points make it straightforward 
to mount sensors, cameras, and other devices. 
It has GPS navigation and an autopilot to deliver autonomous hover, autonomous 
takeoff and landing, autonomous GPS-defined waypoint tracking, including waypoint 
navigation, loiter, circle, and return to launch and return to home. Mission-planning 
software enables unlimited waypoints for reliable, repeatable missions, and flight data 
analysis.  Geofencing and robust failsafes ensure safe operation 
Its propulsion system uses four (in the initial version) or eight (in an enhanced version) 
880 Kv brushless motors 
Its electrical system has a 12-volt regulator to run FPV and gimbals and a I2C splitter for 
extra sensor and device connections. It is compatible with large batteries (up to 12,000 
mAh 4cell LiPo) 
It has a dedicated controller and permits viewing real-time flight data and imagery 
using an iPad, an Android tablet, or a computer. A Tarot 2D brushless gimbal uses two-
axis stabilization technology to ensure stable video in any flight condition. 
The imagery system streams live video with superimposed live telemetry data, fed by a 
variety of cameras. It has its own  5.8 Ghz video transmitter and receiver pair, two 900 
mAh LiPo batteries. 
Additional 4S 6000 mAh batteries can be accommodated to increase endurance and 
payload. 
It accommodates FPV DROP control with goggles. 
All of these have built-in high-definition cameras, capable of streaming real-time 
imagery back to the ground. They all have some level of automated hover and return-
to-home capability, and vary in their ability to accept different equipment. Several of 
these microdrones can fly a pre-programmed flight plan comprised of GPS waypoints 
at specific altitudes. They can hover near or orbit waypoints. All of them have the 
capability of operating at or near the anticipated ceiling for sUAS operation under 
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anticipated regulations.42 All of them can fly at 25-35 knots, adequate for ENG, law-
enforcement support, SAR, and pipeline/powerline patrol. Even the most expensive cost 
much less than a patrol car or ENG van. 
The authors’ flight tests revealed several shortcomings that suggested enhancements to 
mission capabilities in the XXX. First, and most significantly, the DROP’s controls are 
reversed when the Phantom’s orientation is not aligned with the DROP’s line of sight. 
As the aircraft gets further away, it is difficult for the DROP to see which way it is 
aligned. In the flight test that resulted in loss of the aircraft, the authors were doing 
speed tests at a height of about 150 feet above the ground. As the Phantom reached the 
outer boundary of the test range, the DROP was unable to determine its orientation 
unambiguously and also was unable to determine whether the Phantom was flying 
away or back toward the test team as he manipulated the controls. The Phantom flew 
out of sight before control could be regained. Shortly thereafter, the control link and the 
video link were lost as well. 
For reasons yet undetermined, the Phantom’s return-to-home feature did not work, 
although it had worked on three occasions previously. The authors hypothesize that the 
10 to 12 knot wind pushed the Phantom further away whiles its return-to-home feature 
was calculating the course it needed to fly.43 
Any practicable microdrone must be indifferent to the orientation of the aircraft with 
respect to the DROP—like the AR--or, at a minimum, must provide the DROP with 
information about the aircraft’s heading and direction of flight. 
The video imagery available from the Phantom’s forward-looking camera, displayed on 
an iPhone mounted on the control console, is insufficient to permit the DROP to fly the 
                                                 
42  See § ___. 
43 In the 1 February 2014 flight test, control was lost when the Phantom was at 600 feet above the ground 
and about 600 feet slant range away from the drop. The onboard video shows that it took approximately 
three minutes for the Phantom to return to its launching point, and that much of this time was spent in a 
very gradual descent and relatively low forward speed, probably not exceeding ten knots over the 
ground. 
Assuming that is what the Phantom did on last test flight, the wind well may have overwhelmed its slow 
forward speed on his return flight and kept it in the air until its batteries were exhausted.  
What happened after that is unknown. A ground search, including one attempting to regain the 
Phantom’s Wi-Fi signal, was unsuccessful. 
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Phantom by looking at the video screen. 44 The larger screen of an iPad used to control 
the AR provides better guidance, but sunglare and the limited angle of view are still 
problems. The DROP easily gets disoriented and has to require visual contact with the 
drone to re-establish navigation. 
The loss of the Phantom on the 22 February flight test and the coauthors’ inability to 
recover it were also due, in part, to the lack of positional information when control was 
lost. Any operational microdrone must provide latitude and longitude information at 
the point that the control link is lost. That would facilitate recovery.  
For a microdrone to be useful for law-enforcement, ENG, or powerline/pipeline patrol, 
it must have better features. A police officer or photojournalist attempting to obtain 
video imagery from the back yard of a residence, an alley, or a photojournalist 
attempting to obtain a side or rear view of a fire would certainly lose sight of the 
microdrone’s orientation, and well might lose the control link as well. For the return-to-
home feature to work only in zero- or light-wind conditions would exclude conditions 
likely to exist in most real-world incidents, when the stress on both the aircraft and the 
DROP would be significantly higher than in the relatively relaxed atmosphere of the 
authors’ flight test activities. 
Practicable application requires longer endurance, better control, and more robust 
return-to-home features. It should not be difficult to evolve existing products to offers 
these enhancements. Longer endurance is simply is available simply from increasing 
battery capacity. As a general matter, basic airframe weight, exclusive of battery, 
motors, and control systems scale linearly. As power requirements increase, motor 
weight increases linearly. Likewise, as battery capacity increases, battery weight 
increases linearly.  
Extending the range of the control link is lost is mainly a matter of increasing 
transmitter power and receiver sensitivity. Some gain also might be achieved by putting 
                                                 
44  On one part of the 22 February 2014 flight test, the DROP was attempting to fly the Phantom with 
reference only to the video image, while the other member of the team kept the Phantom in sight and 
provided oral cues about its position, orientation, and flight path. The intended flight path took the 
Phantom some 15 or 20 feet over some electric power lines towards the roof of a school. The DROP was 
able see the rooftop on the video display but not the power lines. The video display also was inadequate 
to enable him to  determine the orientation and direction of flight except at the grossest level. He would 
have lost control of it without the oral cues provided by the other member of the team. 
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a directional antenna on the control unit. Because the microdrone is designed to be 
operated always within the DROP’s line of sight, it is reasonable to assume that he will 
always keep the control console pointed at the drone. Transmitter power can be 
increased mainly by redesigning circuits, perhaps adding an amplifier stage, resulting 
in greater power consumption. It is not likely to increase weight much. 
Microdrones similar in basic design to those already on the market, but with the 
improvements outlined in the preceding paragraphs, would enable the following kinds 
of new missions, for both law-enforcement support and ENG.  
Law-enforcement microdrones would be deployed and controlled by ground personnel 
to augment their tactical situational awareness. For example, a unit searching for a 
suspect might launch a microdrone to search rooftops and back yards in a residential 
area, or to search sidestreets and alleys in a commercial district. In many situations, one 
or more microdrones might be launched to enforce a perimeter. In the case of foot- or 
vehicle-pursuits, microdrones might be launched to keep the suspect or his vehicle in 
sight, and reduce the risk of surprise threats to personnel pursing on foot or of vehicle 
collisions. 
Newsgathering microdrones would be standard equipment on ENG ground trucks, 
enabling the journalists to launch them to obtain different perspectives of a newsworthy 
scene. As more ordinary citizens have them, their use would accelerate the trend 
toward TV station use of amateur-captured imagery, as is already common with iPhone 
video. Intermediaries are beginning to emerge that link mainstream broadcasters with 
ordinary citizens who post news, including videos, to social media.45  
Still, many law-enforcement and ENG decisionmakers will resist widespread use of 
microdrones. They will object to any ine-of-sight restriction: the DROP must be in the 
same general vicinity as the drone. Moreover, microdrone assets will have to be widely 
distributed, one in each patrol district, for example, for law-enforcement, and one in 
each ENG truck for newsgathering46 Widely distributing them still does not fulfill the 
                                                 
45 Leslie Kaufman, Teaming With Data-Mining Security Firms to Get a Lead on the News, N. Y. Times, 
Feb. 24, 2014 at B3 (reporting on deal between MSNBC and Vocativ, a startup that mines social media for 
patterns identifying news leads, and identifies video footage not available on larger sites like YouTube 
that are scrubbed by Google and other search engines). 
46 But see Sec. XXX, considering the possibility for launching and controlling microdrones from a manned 
helicopter. 
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requirements for effective news gathering. ENG trucks cannot make it through traffic 
delays to get to a scene faster than a helicopter. ENG trucks cannot cover hundreds of 
miles worth of roads in a single news broadcast. One of the advantages of helicopters is 
that they can be dispatched from a central location and be on the scene in a matter of 
minutes. 
For pipeline and powerline patrols in rural areas, inspection personnel would carry a 
microdrone in their truck. They would launch it and it would patrol 20 miles or so of 
pipeline or powerline.47 The DROP and his console would be in the truck. The truck 
would follow and retrieve it when its battery is battery is exhausted. Then the crew 
would plug in a fully charged battery and repeat the process. The drone would capture 
video, downlink it to the crew, and record it. 
This scenario presents a number of problems however. The body of the truck would 
weaken the control datalink signal, and limit the DROP’s view of the microdrone. In 
remote areas, the full right of way often is not accessible by ground vehicle; that’s one 
reasons helicopters perform the patrol function. If the control and video downlink 
signals are carried by WiFi the drone would quickly fly out of range; the truck is not 
going to able to maintain 40 miles/hour over unimproved roadways under powerlines 
or beside pipelines.  
Analysis raises significant doubts about whether this microdrone scenario would 
provide any benefits over manned-helicopter patrols. The helicopter can do 90 miles or 
so per mission, with no need for a ground crew to follow it. It can rely on visual 
observation by the flight crew rather than video to be reviewed after the fact. Indeed, a 
microdrone-centered operation might cost more than a helicopter-centered operation 
and be less effective. 
Microdrones can play only a limited role in search operations, essentially supporting 
ground personnel when manned helicopters are unavailable.  
2. Machodrone 
Machodrones will be late arrivals in the civilian world, preceded by microdrones. But 
microdrones will be suitable only for a relatively small part of the missions now flown 
                                                 
47 Assuming endurance of a half hour and speed of 40 miles per hour. 
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by manned helicopters, mainly supplementing manned helicopters by flying at lower 
heights and closer in to the target. 
The novelty of microdrone applications and their limitations compared with familiar 
manned helicopters, will cause many potential purchasers to focus their interest on 
machodrones, with altitude, speed, endurance and imagery capabilities now required of 
ENG and law-enforcement patrol helicopters. 
Two alternative approaches exist for machodrone design to meet these requirements: 
adaptation of an existing type, or bottoms-up conceptualization of something new. The 
second approach is far more ambitious and riskier, but more likely to produce an 
aircraft that matches technology to mission. 
The first, more cautious, approach would take an existing light helicopter model and 
make modifications so that it can be flown remotely to meet mission requirements for 
ENG or law-enforcement support and to satisfy FAA regulations for NAS integration.48 
The central advantage of this approach is that much of the design and fabrication of the 
base aircraft could remain intact, saving much engineering effort. There would be no 
need to change the fuselage, the engine, or the drivetrain, including the gearbox. Main- 
and tail-rotors and their hubs would remain the same. The seats for pilot and passenger 
and the instrument panel would be removed and mission equipment installed in their 
place. Cameras and an antenna assembly would be installed on the outside of the 
fuselage. 
A system--basically the backend of an autopilot49—would move the control rods and 
the throttle linkage according to DROP inputs received over the control link.50 Existing 
                                                 
48 This has already occurred in the defense context. Boeing developed an unmanned version of the 
Robinson R22 in 1999, which became the Renegade. The effort evolved into the A160T Hummingbird, a 
turbine-engine adaptation of the R22,48 and the Unmanned Little Bird, a modified MD 530F. 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/rotorcraft/military/ulb/index.page?. 
49 The baseline autopilot would have more capability that the typical two-axis commercial system for light 
helicopters.  See R. Randall Padfield, Cobham HeliSAS Brings Viable Autopilot to Light Helicopters (HAI 
Convention News  2013), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/haiconvention-news/2013-03-
06/cobham-helisas-brings-viable-autopilot-light-helicopters (reviewing performance of autopilot 
marketed for Bell 406, Bell 407 and Eurocopter AS350). The machodrone’s on-board system would need 
to be capable of flying the helicopter in coupled mode. See generally See generally Frank Lomardi, 
Automatic Flight Control Systems, Rotor & Wing, June 1, 2013, 
http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/commercial/technology/Automatic-Flight-Control-
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technology would couple flight-director features to the autopilot. The flight director, in 
turn would be controlled remotely by the DROP, almost certainly modified to allow 
fine adjustments by the DROP around or along any axis, as well as the typical gross 
controls of heading, altitude and speed found on manned autopilot interfaces. Systems 
for remote control of lights, electrical systems, and engine start also would have to be 
installed. 
The second, more ambitious, approach would not depend on any existing type of 
helicopter; it would aim at creating an entirely original design.51  
Such an original design would likely result in an electrically powered quadcopter the 
side and capability of a manned light helicopter. Such an aircraft would avoid the 30% 
purely parasitic power consumption of the tail rotor by the counter rotating multiple 
rotors. It would avoid the weight and complexity of mechanical linkages to control 
blade pitch by relying on electric propulsion.52 
The cost side of the design equation is not zero, however. Every basic system—
structures, airfoils, rotors, electric motors and their control systems, batteries, flight 
control systems, and sensors—would be designed from basic principles. Theory would 
produce drawings and models; wind tunnel aerodynamic and static and destructive 
structures testing would provide iterative adjustments to basic design concepts; 
materials alternatives would be identified and choices made, flight control algorithms 
conceived and debugged. Then full-scale prototypes would be fabricated, and flight 
testing would result in further design changes. At every step of the process, 
performance would be traded-off against weight; performance and weight would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
Systems_79368.html#.Uvkw4PldU40 (explaining differences among stability-augmentation systems, 
stability-and-control-augmentation systems, and true, fully coupled autopilots). 
50  Electrical, hydraulic, or electro-hydraulic servos would move the cyclic forward and aft, left and right, 
to move the tail-rotor pitch control left and right, and to position the collective up or down. A 
combination of mechanical correlator and electrical governor, already installed on many helicopters, 
would manage the throttle setting in accordance with collective position. 
51  A similar approach has been followed by Agusta/Westland in its Project Zero, aimed at designing a 
feasible electrically powered in-wing tiltrotor technology demonstrator. See 
http://www.agustawestland.com/node/6902 
52  See § ___ for an explanation of why electric propulsion systems for rotorcraft obviate the need for blade 
pitch change. 
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traded off against raw materials costs and manufacturing costs; and everything would 
be tested against marketability.53 
The development effort would be enormous, but the result would be a machodrone 
optimized to perform machodrone missions, rather than a prisoner of design decisions 
made in the past to optimize a vehicle to carry people. 
Either type of machodrone would be designed to perform missions similar to those 
performed today by manned law-enforcement and ENG helicopters. 
Missions begin either with the aircraft already in the air on routine patrol, or with the 
aircraft sitting on the ramp. Preflight inspection is done as soon as the crew’s watch 
begins. Before the mission begins, the DROP and DROSOP are at their console in the 
ground control facility. DROPs and DROTOGs are stationed at the drone deployment 
site. Presumably the operators would be located at an airport or heliport, requiring a 
control room with the equipment necessary to fly the drone and systems for the 
DROTOG to work the camera and feed video to the news station. Having the two 
operators allow good teamwork and smooth operations.  
The crew gets a call requiring deployment of the drone to provide support for ground 
units involved in a particular incident, or to provide coverage of newsworthy 
occurrences . The initial call out will be ambiguous as to certain aspects of location. The 
drone is airborne within 60 seconds and headed toward the incident, complying with 
ATC instructions and maneuvering to avoid other traffic in the vicinity. Enroute, the 
crew maintains voice communications with appropriate ground units, commanders or 
newsdesks over regular VHF or UHF voice frequencies 
The drone sends real-time video imagery captured by its cameras, with quality 
equivalent to that that captured by state-of-the-art ENG cameras. The video imagery 
field-of-view would include 270° lateral coverage,54 and -10 to +90° vertical coverage. 
When the drone reaches the incident scene, it hovers or flies a low-altitude orbit, 300-
500 feet above ground level, at no more than 30 knots ground speed. In this flight 
                                                 
53  An accessible but excellent summary of the design process for a much simpler vehicle is available from 
the University of Maryland team that designed the runner up in the Sikorsky human-powered aircraft 
competition. See http://www.agrc.umd.edu/gamera/docs/pubs/gamera2-design.pdf 
54 The peripheral cameras need not have the same resolution as the forward-looking camera. Their 
purpose is to support traffic avoidance by the DROP, not to capture mission imagery. 
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configuration, the DROSOP must be able to pan the camera in elevation and azimuth 
and zoom the lens optically to achieve 100-times magnification when it is zoomed out. 
The imagery downlink to the ground station would provide quality equivalent to 1920 x 
768 HD mpeg-4. Either the DROP or the DROSOP would be able to toggle the forward-
looking camera between infrared and full-color modes and see the results on the 
console displays. The system would have video recording equipment that can capture 
up to three hours of video in the same quality available over the downlink. The 
recording equipment would be on board both the drone and the ground station to allow 
for interruption of the downlink. 
For law-enforcement applications the DROSOP would be able to control the high-
intensity searchlight on the drone in elevation and azimuth and to link its orientation to 
that of the forward looking camera. 
The use of machodrones for powerline and pipeline patrol is even easier to 
contemplate. These operations occur in remote areas and require less ad-hoc, scene 
specific, maneuvering than law-enforcement and ENG applications. A machodrone 
could be programmed to fly the line of a pipeline or powerline and send its imagery 
back to the DROP and a utility specialist, who could take control when he sees 
something that requires a closer look. It also is desirable for a remote DROP flying 
powerline or pipeline patrol missions to be able to hand off control to the ground crew 
on the scene, especially if a machodrone actually is involved in delivering components 
for installation.55 
Machodrones can support search and rescue missions flying like manned helicopters 
conducting a search. They would fly a standard search grid with no more than 50 feet 
deviation from any leg and delivering to the DROSOP real-time full-motion, high-
definition, video and infrared imagery equivalent to that obtained by the a manned 
helicopter They could record the full-motion video and infrared imagery on board the 
drone or at the ground station, at the option of the DROSOP. They could illuminate the 
ground with the high-intensity searchlight at all of the specified altitudes, be able to 
broadcast an oral message originating with the DROSOP in real time to a person on the 
                                                 
55  The idea is similar to that of a remotely control locomotive in a rail freight classification yard. If the 
crew on the ground directly controls the vehicle, they avoid delays and potential errors involved in 
communicating commands to the operator – the engineer of the locomotive, analagous to a DROP in a 
remote location. 
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ground at an audio level of at least 95 DB on the ground, and be capable flying at 
speeds from a hover to 60 knots at the option of the DROP 
They could fly for six hours at heights above the ground from 200 feet to 3,000 feet at 
the option of the DROP or DROSOP 
Eventually machodrones could accomplish rescues or providing logistical support in 
disaster areas. They would have all of the capabilities specified for a search and rescue 
drone, and, in addition, be capable of landing within a person or object on the ground 
within a radius of 25 feet, under the control of the DROP, where they would release a 
pallet or similar container with up to 100 pounds of relief supplies such as blankets, 
water, food rations, and a handheld radio 
The DROP would have system function/malfunction indications equivalent to those 
available on manned helicopters.  
The drone would have the capability to fly autonomously and land successfully at the 
launching point if the control link is lost for more than two seconds, or if the remaining 
battery charge is insufficient to fly back to the launching point, plus 15 minutes. If other 
specific system malfunctions occur, the drone would remain under the control of the 
DROP, so that he can make decisions about the safest course of action. 
Either of the machodrone design approaches would result in an aircraft that could 
perform the same basic functions as a manned helicopter in law-enforcement support, 
newsgathering, and pipeline/powerline patrol activities. Merely because it can be done, 
however, does not answer the crucial questions that will decide whether it will be done: 
First, why is a machodrone necessary, as compared with a microdrone or a manned 
helicopter designed to perform the same functions?  
Second, will the cost and capabilities of a machodrone make it attractive to customers?  
The first question is easier to answer than the second. Machodrones, compared with 
microdrones, will be able to carry more payload, at higher altitudes, beyond the line of 
sight of the DROP.56 Relaxing these limitations of microdrones is essential to achieve 
                                                 
56  The microdrone limitations are not the result of technology; range of the control link, payload, and 
ceiling can be scaled up. The limitations are the result of microdrone mission concepts being driven by 
what is already on the market. 
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mainstream mission performance. Law-enforcement agencies, TV stations, and utilities 
use manned helicopters now because they can quickly get from one place to another in 
an operating radius of a couple hundred miles. They can carry 500- to 1,000 pounds of 
high definition color video and infrared cameras, automatic tracking downlink 
microwave antennas, and searchlights. They hover, orbit, and quickly change position 
as developments on the ground indicate. They can safely fly anywhere from 300 feet 
above the ground to several thousand feet. Microdrones can do none of these things, 
although as § XXX explains, they can do useful things at the margins of current mission 
requirements. Why machodrones, as compared with manned helicopters, are necessary 
depends on their capabilities and cost. 
This leads to the second, harder, question: whether machodrones can be built that will 
be attractive to customers who have a wide variety of manned helicopters available for 
purchase lease or contract to perform the same missions. In every instance in which a 
vendor might offer a machodrone, the customer can decide between it and a manned 
helicopter. The customer is not going to choose a machodrone unless it provides some 
concrete, quantifiable advantages, such as one or more of the following: 
It can fly missions that would jeopardize the lives of a helicopter flight crew. This is the 
predominant reason why machodrones are attractive to the armed forces, intelligence 
agencies, and special operations units. They can fly into situations where the aircraft 
flight crew might be lost. Their ability to do this expands this set of missions likely to be 
approved. It also reduces the cost of supporting systems such as those to retrieve pilots 
who have been shot down, thus reducing overall system cost. This is a major reason 
why drones are attractive to military and intelligence commanders. It is far less likely to 
be an important consideration in law-enforcement support, newsgathering, or pipeline 
and powerline patrol, except, perhaps, for close in inspection or delivery of components 
for installation on powerlines. 
They will have lower direct operating costs. The most significant components of direct 
operating costs are fuel and labor costs for the flight crew and mechanics. The skill 
levels – thought maybe not the temperament – required for DROPS will be similar to 
that required of helicopter pilots. There is a reason to believe that compensation levels 
for DROPS will be lower. Nor is there any reason to believe that labor hours  per flight 
hour will be any different. Likewise, mechanic labor input and skill levels are likely to 
be equivalent to that for helicopters, so therefore the compensation will be the same. 
30 
 
Fuel costs are likely to be similar to helicopters for machodrones powered by piston or 
turboshaft engines. For machodrone designs employing electric power, comparing 
helicopter fuel costs with the equivalent for the machodrone will require a more 
complicated calculation, one that takes into account the trade-offs among engine 
weight, fuel weight, electricity to recharge the batteries, and so on.57 But basic energy 
calculations suggest that the propulsion costs will be comparable, absent radical 
changes in oil prices. 
Utilization may be higher for machodrones.58 There is no reason to believe this would be the 
case, unless maintenance costs are lower, which is unlikely. 
Acquisition costs for machodrones may be lower than for helicopters. This might be the case 
because machodrones can be a bit smaller and still have the same payload capabilities, 
because there are no people aboard. It might be the case because physical features, such 
as energy-absorbing seats, intended to protect the flight crew from harm, are not 
necessary. It might be the case because onboard displays and instrumentation for the 
flight crew is not necessary. The first two of these might reduce acquisition costs, but 
the third is illusory. Whatever is necessary to be displayed in the cockpit for regular 
helicopter pilot will have to be displayed on the ground to the DROP. 
Several factors may cause machodrones to cost more than manned helicopters, even 
before development costs are amortized over a production run. Sophisticated, reliable 
control systems are necessary for machodrones and unnecessary for manned 
helicopters. Special cameras and displays will be necessary for DROPs to obtain a 
replica of the visual site picture naturally available if they were the cockpit. The degree 
of automation for flight controls will be higher for machodrones than for manned 
helicopters. It is easier to fly manned helicopters with stabilization systems or autopilots 
then to fly them without such systems, but a human pilot easily can fly safely with less 
sophisticated flight controls. 
                                                 
57  The authors acknowledge good research contributions on battery technology from Patrick Grimaldi, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2016. 
58  Utilization is a common measure of efficiency for aircraft operations. Typically, efficiency is 
represented by the average number of revenue hours per day divided by 24 hours. It can be influenced by 
crew available ability, schedule constraints, or aircraft downtime for maintenance. 
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Then there is the question of recovering development costs. New aircraft are introduced 
in the marketplace only when a sufficient number of customers are willing to pay a 
price necessary to recover the direct cost of manufacturing, and to permit the developer 
to recover its development costs over the total number of sales. Aircraft manufacturers 
and their investors simply will not go forward with a program unless they believe that 
they will sell enough to recover development costs and earn a reasonable return on 
investment as well. Development costs of any machodrone program will be enormous, 
particularly one that is zero-based.59 
Some rough numbers might be helpful in understanding the issue. 
Development costs for new commercial airliners is approaching $20 billion per 
offering.60 Development costs for the Global Hawk were estimated as $2.5 billion by the 
GAO, in 2006,61 compared with $178 million for the Predator.62 The order-of-magnitude 
difference resulted, among other things, from “immature” technologies employed in the 
Global Hawk, compared to "mostly mature" technologies in the Predator.63 
With a length of 27 feet, a wingspan of 49 feet, and a maximum gross weight of 2250 
pounds, the Predator is roughly the size of a machodrone with capabilities equivalent to 
                                                 
59  In the past, new civilian aircraft designs have been introduced only because much of the development 
has been paid for by the Defense Department for military versions. The 747 was drawn from Boeing’s 
entry into the C-5 heavy logistics system competition. Most early civilian helicopters were only minor 
variations of designs that has been paid for by the armed forces. That is not likely to be the case for 
civilian machodrones, because their mission requirements are so different from those for armed forces or 
intelligence applications, which emphasize combat environments and delivering fires. It should be no 
surprise that impressive machines exist in the national security context that have no civilian application. 
F-18s, F-35's, and nuclear submarines are obvious examples. 
60  http://www.booz.com/global/home/what-we-think/industry-perspectives/display/2013-aerospace-
industry-perspective?pg=all (identifying price tag for large commercial wide-bodyes as more than $19 
billion). 
61  GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past  Efforts to Craft Better 
and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies (March 2006), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/249317.pdf at page 9. 
62  Id. at page 10. 
63  Id. at 11. “New signals intelligence and multiplatform radar systems were still in technology 
development, not expected to be mature and be tested in an operational environment until sometime 
between 2009 and 2011. . . [T]here is risk that the aircraft, already being produced, will not have sufficient 
space, power, or cooling or that the sensor systems will weigh more than planned, reducing aircraft 
performance and ability to meet overall mission requirements—altitude, speed, and endurance." Id. at 
page 16. 
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that of a light manned helicopter. A civilian machdrone of similar size would not need 
the armament or targeting systems in the Predator, but it would need everything else. 
Even if the simpler civilian design cut the development cost by 90%, development 
would still cost on the order of $20 million.64 
An AS350B2 news helicopter is priced at about $2.2 million. If that price reflects 
manufacturing costs only, because AS350 development costs have been fully recovered, 
it is reasonable to assume that manufacturing costs for a comparable machodrone 
would be similar. So a machodrone would have to sell 40 copies at a price $500,000 
higher than an AS350B2 to recover its development costs. 
There are 757 AS-350 helicopters presently registered in the United States.65 That means 
that a machodrone manufacturer would have to displace 5% of Airbus Helicopters’ 
market share to achieve a profitable program.  
3. Hybrid helicopter/drone operations 
The principal limitations of microdrone capability relate to the logistics of getting them 
where they are needed and then retrieving them after they exhaust their limited range. 
An attractive way to deal with the first of these limitations is to use a hybrid approach: 
a combination of a manned helicopter and one or more microdrones. This is more 
interesting in the context of ENG and pipeline/powerline patrol, because in law-
enforcement applications ground units are usually on the scene already and can deploy 
microdrones themselves, even if manned helicopters also are involved. Once 
machodrones become commercially available, one can envision law-enforcement or 
ENG missions in which a manned helicopter controls drones that are deployed on an 
ad-hoc basis to capture imagery that could not safely be captured by the manned 
helicopter--for example close-up shots of a fire or a vehicle involved in an accident, or of 
a suspect taken from an angle that is unavailable to the manned aircraft without 
compromising safety. It is not clear, however, how much closer a drone could get than 
the effect of a manned helicopter with a zoom lens.  
                                                 
64  Separating airworthiness certification cost from other development costs is essentially arbitrary, 
because the certification process and design development process are iterative. A particular subsystem 
design is submitted to the FAA and tested and found deficient in one way or another, so it is redesigned. 
The same kind of proof of design testing would be necessary, even without FAA airworthiness 
certification requirements. 
65  FAA aircraft registration database (search results for name and model). 
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In the hybrid application, a manned helicopter would be equipped with one or more 
microdrones to be deployed from the helicopter in-flight. The DROP would be aboard 
the helicopter, in addition to the customary crew of pilot and photog. 
The helicopter would be deployed to the scene of a newsworthy event in the same way 
that it is presently. Once it gets to the scene, helicopter crew and the station personnel 
would make a decision as to whether deployment of microdrones would aid in 
coverage. If they decide it would, the pilot would maneuver the helicopter so the drone 
could be launched safely without the risk of its impacting the main or tail rotor, or 
being overpowered by the downwash.66  
The microdrone could then fly flight profiles desirable for photographic coverage while 
the helicopter collects its own imagery from a flight profile that is safe for it. 
Microdrones, for example, could hover with the tailwind or come closer to a fire or 
situation involving gunfire, either of which would endanger the personnel in the 
helicopter. 
Similarly, for pipeline/powerline patrol, one or more microdrones would be launched 
from a manned helicopter and the microdrones would be flown closer to the hardware 
than the helicopter safely could do. For pipeline/powerline patrol, a greater degree of 
autonomous flight67 by the microdrone would be desirable, relieving the DROP of the 
monotony of having to fly up along a regular and completely predictable path followed 
by the pipeline or powerline. 
How the microdrones would be retrieved after their battery power is exhausted is a 
matter that requires further consideration. It is unlikely to be cost-effective to equip the 
helicopter to retrieve them in flight. So they would land somewhere. Then, in a rural 
setting, the helicopter might land the pick them up, or they could be retrieved by 
ground personnel later. 
                                                 
66  One way to reduce the risk would be to launch the drone from the right side of the helicopter, while 
the helicopter is in a slight sideslip to the left. This would ensure that the rotor wash blows the micro 
drone away from rather than into the tail rotor. 
Even if a safe altitude for the helicopter exceeded the ceiling of the microdrone, the microdrone would 
just descend under control to its operating altitude, where its available thrust would balance would 
balance gravitational forces. 
67  See § XXX. 
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This mission definition takes advantage of comparative advantages of both types of 
vehicles: the superior imagery available from the helicopter and its flexibility of higher 
altitude and flexible deployment, and the microdrone’s abilities to operate in closer 
quarters in regimes that would be hazardous to the helicopter. 
A number of caveats are necessary, however. Safety becomes a concern with multi-
purpose-role ENG platforms.  Drones flying near helicopters are a potential collision 
hazard. Drones impact obstacles frequently due to DROP uncontrollability.  Drones 
become a hazard to bystanders on the ground.  
ENG teams will not have the ability to manage multiple tasks. The first concern is the 
pilots’ situational awareness becoming over saturated.  The Photog has a duty to 
provide the station with two pictures while shooting the scene. DROPS are challenged 
with flying a small drone under the limits of line of sight.   
III. Regulatory constraints 
The FAA's regulatory approach, which has considerable buy-in--at least at the 
philosophical level--from major industry groups and other interested parties, is to 
establish separate regulatory regimes for microdrones and machodrones. Microdrones 
will be regulated under an adaptation of the non-mandatory FAA protocols for model 
aircraft flight. Machodrones will be regulated under an adaptation of the basic rules for 
manned aircraft, requiring certification of aircraft and personnel, and detailed flight 
rules. 
The FAA's plans for integrating drones into the NAS roughly classifies them into two 
size categories: microdrones (sUAS) and machodrones (all other UAS).68 Microdrones 
will fly only at low heights within sight of the DROP, but will be subject to only a few 
equipment requirements aimed at traffic separation. Machodrones will be able to fly in 
any unrestricted airspace, subject to aircraft certification, pilot certification, and 
                                                 
68 The distinction originates with section 313 of the 2012 Act, which obligates the FAA to determine if 
certain drones possessing the characteristics of microdrones can be operated safely before the overall plan 
is implemented. 
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demanding equipment requirements to ensure traffic separation.69 In effect, 
microdrones are segregated, while machodrones will be integrated. 
This approach makes sense. As drones become larger and more advanced, flying 
higher, faster and out of line of sight, model aircraft rules are insufficient. Regulatory 
requirements must reflect a tradeoff between weight and capability, on the one hand,  
and equipment and operating-rule flight restrictions, on the other. If a drone weighs 
more than, say, ten pounds, drones be equipped with ADS-B Out, so that low flying 
aircraft have a chance to “see” and avoid it. The DROP needs training and certification 
on how to operate the drone safely as not to cause interference with other aircraft. The 
bigger and better performing the drone, the more regulatory oversight it and the DROP 
need to fly safely. The smaller and lesser performing drones need less certification and 
under a certain weight class ADS-B should not be mandatory.  
The FAA's definition of the boundary between microdrones and machodrones is critical 
to their safe integration onto the NAS and to their utility in the marketplace. The 
philosophy for microdrone regulation is to keep them mostly out of airspace used by 
manned aircraft and to keep them within the line of sight of the operator so as to reduce 
the need for him to rely on sophisticated video subsystems to maintain control, 
navigate, and avoid other traffic. A weight restriction for the microdrone category 
conceptually limits the damage resulting from collision with another aircraft or with an 
object or person on the ground. 
The very light microdrones now on the market for hobbyists, such as the ARDrone2.0 
and the Phantom 2 Vision, are not likely to represent much of a hazard, unless one of 
them happens to hit the tail rotor of a helicopter.  
                                                 
69 The basic outline for regulation of drones is reasonably clear, based on the 2012 Act and the FAA’s 
Comprehensive Plan and the FAA Roadmap. FAA, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap (2013), 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf [hereinafter "Roadmap"]. The 
Roadmap addresses aircraft certification, operating rules, and airman qualification, generally following 
the recommendations of an industry advisory group. Roadmap sec. 1.4.3 at p. 11 (summarizing RTIC 
principles). The RTCA has not been free from difficulties. See Bill Carey, New RTCA Committee Seeks to 
Expedite UAS Standards, AINonline, http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2013-04-05/new-rtca-
committee-seeks-expedite-uas-standards (Apr. 5, 2013) (reporting on slow progress of 2004 committee 
and its replacement by new committee with mandate to expedite drone-integration standards 
development). 
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The core of the evolving regulatory environment is the identification of technologies 
that will allow drones and manned aircraft to co-exist. 
A. “Integration” 
The 2012 legislation70 requires the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with 
interested parties, to "develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration 
of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system."71 The FAA’s 
Comprehensive Plan explicitly assumes that routine UAS operation should not require 
exceptions or unique authorizations.72 
1. Segregating microdrones 
Paradoxically, microdrones will be “integrated” essentially by being segregated into 
parts of the airspace not generally used by manned aircraft. Like model aircraft, they 
must be flown only where they can be seen by the operator and not near airports or 
areas of dense population. Additionally, microdrones will be subject to a maximum 
weight restriction. 
Thus restricted, micro drones need less scrutiny of control-link integrity, imaging 
sensors, display of imagery to the drop, and they do not need traffic avoidance systems. 
Working out detailed requirements for microdrones is relatively straightforward: only 
about a half-dozen specific decisions must be made. Accordingly the regulatory regime 
for microdrones will be in place much sooner than that for machodrones. 
The requirements for public-use microdrones have crystallized in a form that resembles 
rules for non-commercial model aircraft flight.73 The requirements for civil microdrones 
are still in their infancy, but can be expected to resemble those for public-use. 
The 2012 Act requires the FAA to decide if microdrones represent a separable category 
that can be regulated in a simpler regime than is necessary for machodrones.74 The FAA 
                                                 
70  FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub.L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (Feb. 14, 2012). 
71  Id. sec. 332(a)(1). Section 332 of the 2012 Act obligates the FAA, in consultation with the aviation 
industry, to develop a plan to integrate drones into the National Airspace System. Sec. 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 
73. 
72  Comprehensive Plan at p.8. 
73  See § ___ 
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appears to have concluded that the answer to the question is, "yes,"75 but it has not 
followed through with early-stage procedures that permit available microdrones to be 
flown, even in test and demonstration environments, let alone to lay any real 
groundwork for their operational deployment. For example, microdrones, even tiny 
ones like the Hubsan,76 may not be flown for commercial purposes at all unless they 
have a special airworthiness certificate. The current application for special 
airworthiness certificates77 provides, among other things: 
• Only manufacturers can obtain airworthiness certificates for production flight 
testing.78  
• Flight is limited to geographic areas specified in the SAC.79 
• Applicants must submit, "flight manuals" and checklists, evidence of a training 
program for crewmembers, who must be licensed pilots or have completed an 
FAA-approved training program,80 
• FAA inspection of aircraft, control stations, and support equipment81  
• The microdrone must be equipped with a transponder82 
• Two-hour advance coordination with ATC83 
• Annual inspection by a certified mechanic84 
                                                                                                                                                             
74  Section 333, Pub.L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (based on size, weight, speed, operational 
capability, proximity to airports and populated areas, and operation within visual line 
of sight). 
75  Roadmap at p.58 (section C.6, discussing goal of accelerated regulatory safe harbor 
for sUAS). 
76   [CITE and describe Hubsan] 
77  FAA Order 8130.34C, 
http://rgl.faa.gov/regulatory_and_guidance_library/rgOrders.nsf/0/10947cee0052205886257bbe0057bd76/$
FILE/8130.34C.pdf 
78  Id., section 2, paragraph 4(a)(2), at page 2-4. 
79  chap. 3, sec. 1, para. 3, at page 3-1; Appendix A, para. 3. 
80  id. at page A-4 (requiring PIC with at least a private pilot certificate) 
81  Id. at pages 3-3 and 3-4; 
82  Id. at page A-7. 
83  Id. at page A-8. 
84  Id. at page A-9. 
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Existing microdrones, even the larger ones, cannot satisfy these requirements. One 
might try to defend the FAA's position by arguing that the requirements are necessary 
to ensure safety of other aircraft and persons or property on the ground. But this is not 
so. 
There is no apparent reason why the FAA could not simply formalize its guidance for 
model aircraft, along the lines approved by the Congress in section 336 of the 2012 Act, 
and permit microdrone test and demonstration programs for commercial purposes 
under those rules. 
The contents of the application for a special airworthiness certificate and especially 
Appendix A of the order, are manifestly unsuited for microdrones, given their size, 
payload, and flight profiles. The transponder requirement, the geographic limitations, 
and the reference to chase planes are entirely inconsistent with the features of 
microdrones. Unless the FAA provides for a separate pathway for microdrone testing, it 
is not acting consistent with its declared intention to accelerate integration of 
microdrones into the NAS.  
Nor is it feasible to shift the burden of applying for certification to manufacturers of 
microdrones, allowing operators to fly certificated microphones within specified 
limitations. Part of the content of each certificate defines limited geographic areas 
within which microdrones can be operated, and presumably a new certificate would be 
required for each purchaser. 
a) Public use 
Federal, state, and local governmental entities may not fly drones in the national 
airspace unless they obtain a Certificate of Waiver of Authorization ("COA") from the 
FAA.85 The 2012 Act requires the Secretary to expedite issuance of COAs for public 
UAS. 86 
Section 334 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 201287 requires the FAA, 
within 90 days of enactment, to enter into agreements with government agencies to 
"simplify the process for issuing certificates of waiver or authorization" for small drones 
operated: 
                                                 
85  FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=68004. 
86  Id. § 334. 
87  Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11. 
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“(i) within the line of sight of the operator; 
“(ii) less than 400 feet above the ground; 
“(iii) during daylight conditions; 
“(iv) within Class G airspace; and 
“(v) outside of 5 statute miles from any airport, heliport, seaplane base, spaceport, or 
other location with aviation activities."88 
The FAA reported that it "and the Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice 
have established an agreement that meets the congressional mandate. Initially, law 
enforcement organizations will receive a COA for training and performance evaluation. 
When the organization has shown proficiency in flying its UAS, it will receive an 
operational COA. The agreement also expands the allowable UAS weight up to 25 
pounds."89 
Pursuant to the Congressional mandate, the FAA simplified its process for considering 
governmental requests for COAs.90 It expanded the default period of authorization to 24 
months from 12, increased allowable weight to 25 pounds, and announced that it would 
issue COAs to law-enforcement agencies for training and performance evaluation, to be 
followed by operational authority once the applicant establishes proficiency.91 It 
established a web-based application procedure, and provided for expedited procedures 
for one-time approvals of time-sensitive disaster relief missions.92  
b) Remote-controlled model aircraft 
The microdrone requirements resemble those for remotely controlled model airplanes, 
under a 1981 FAA Advisory Circular.93 The Congress has essentially embraced these 
restrictions. Section 336 of the 2012 Act prohibits the FAA from promulgating rules for 
model aircraft, which it defines as "unmanned aircraft . . . (2) flown with visual line of 
                                                 
88  Pub. L. 112-95 § 334(c)(2). 
89  http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=68004 (May 14, 2012). 
90  http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=68004. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  AC91-57 (June 8, 1981), http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/540-c.pdf. 
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sight of the person operating the aircraft; and (3) flown for hobby or recreational 
purposes.94 The prohibition applies only if: 
“(1) the aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; 
“(2) the aircraft is operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety 
guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide community-based 
organization; 
“(3) the aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified 
through a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety program 
administered by a community-based organization; 
“(4) the aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to 
any manned aircraft; and 
“(5) when flown within 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the aircraft provides the 
airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic facility is 
located at the airport) with prior notice of the operation (model aircraft operators flying 
from a permanent location within 5 miles of an airport should establish a mutually-
agreed upon operating procedure with the airport operator and the airport air traffic 
control tower (when an air traffic facility is located at the airport))."95 
c) Height and weight restrictions 
Heavier drones have more potential than lighter drones to create damage to bystanders 
and personal property. If a Cessna 172 crashes, it will not have the same effect as a 
Boeing 777 crashing. Heavier drones also, because they have more mass, have more 
kinetic energy to destroy opposing aircraft.  Lighter drones will have less demanding 
certification requirements than heavier drones and will not require specific operator 
certification.  
(1) Height restriction 
Limiting the maximum height above the ground for microdrone flights promote safety 
by reducing the likelihood of encountering conflicting traffic. Lower heights also mean 
                                                 
94  Sec. 336(c) 
95  Sec. 336(a), 2012 Act. The 1981 Circular adds: “No flight higher than 400 feet above the surface.  
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less kinetic energy stored in a drone falling out of the sky, but a few calculations about 
terminal velocity will show this is not very important 
The height restriction for micro-drones may not be as effective as it might seem, 
however. Seaplanes, for example, regularly fly enroute only 300 feet above the water. 
There are some areas of the country, such as the area north of Boeing Field in Seattle, 
and in the Anchorage Alaska area, where the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid rule is 
crucial at low altitudes. 
In the vicinity of the Kenmore (W55) and Seattle (0W0) seaplane bases, near Seattle, for 
example, the floor of the Seattle-Tacoma (KSEA) Class B airspace is 1800 feet MSL and 
the class C airspace for Boeing Field begins just to the south.  Aircraft flying instrument 
approaches into runway 13 fly under this airspace, talking to approach control rather 
than CTAF. To the southeast, the Rogers Post Memorial Seaport (W36) lies under the 
Class D airspace for Renton (KRNT). News helicopters, traffic into Boeing Field and 
seaplanes operating into Kenmore and Seattle intermingle a regular basis, 
communicating on the CTAF frequency. Seeing other traffic and taking appropriate of a 
selection is crucial in a space like this.  
There are maybe a half-dozen parts of the country in which see-and-avoid is equally 
challenging. One way to deal with this is to prohibit either microdrone or machodrone 
flights in these areas. 
(2) The weight restriction 
Imposing a height restriction on microdrone operation is not enough; manned aircraft 
fly below 400 feet, and a microdrone mishap can endanger persons or property on the 
ground regardless of the height at which the drone was operating. A weight restriction 
also is appropriate. If a small drone weighing less than, say, ten pounds were to collide 
with an aircraft, survivability would be much greater than colliding with something any 
larger. Bird strikes are the number two accident cause with helicopters.96 In one case the 
                                                 
96   http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/06/06/helicopters-and-bird-strikes-results-from-first-analysis-available-
online/; Washburn et al, Bird Strike Hazards and Mitigation Strategies for Military Rotary-wing Aircraft 
(31 December 2012) (Project No. 11-944), 
https://www.dodlegacy.org/Legacy/project/productdocs/FINAL%20OSD%20Legacy%20Report%20Joint
%20RW%20Bird%20Strike%20Hazardswithcomments%20FINAL_ff16305b-b450-4d1c-9050-
4404d614c07c.pdf [hereinafter "Bird Strike Study"]. Helicopters are much more likely to be damaged by 
bird strikes than fixed-wing aircraft. Bird Strike Study at 2. 
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pilot was incapacitated when a bird penetrated the bubble. In another, a larger bird 
impacted the main rotor causing it to separate and killing the occupants of the 
helicopter. Larger birds cause more damages and worse injuries.97 Bigger birds have a 
mass similar to microdrones now on the market. The Phantom microdrone, for 
example, has a mass roughly equivalent to that of a mallard duck or a seagull.98 An 
AR.Drone2.0 is similar to a rock pigeon.99  
A weight limitation promotes safety by limiting the kinetic energy in the drone and 
therefore reduces the damage to another aircraft, ground objects, or persons on the 
ground if a collision or crash occurs. Engineering ballistics analysis backs this up and 
shows the relationship between drone weight and expected damage.100 
A similar relationship between mass and damage to persons or objects on the the 
ground exists: the heavier the object, the more damage and the greater the hazard. 
The current limit of 55 pounds seems too high, considering how much damage a 9.2 
pound Canadian goose can do.  
                                                 
97  Bird Strike Study at 17, 47. 200 bird strikes with U.S. civil helicopters were reported in 2011. Bird Strike 
Study at 41. 
98  Roger Nicholson, Kinetic Energy of Bird Strikes & Damage to Aircraft (Boeing technical paper). 
99  Id. 
100 Damage done when two objects collide depends on the kinetic energy of each when the collision 
occurs. Kinetic energy of a moving object is half of its mass times its velocity squared. If an aircraft 
collides with a hailstone, likely damage to the aircraft is modest. A small hailstone weighing one gram 
(0.002 pounds), has kinetic energy of 20.5 foot-poundals relative to a helicopter moving at 60 knots. The 
hailstone is not likely to have much horizontal velocity on its own. A 2.5-pound bird or 
microdrone has kinetic energy of 25,643 foot poundals. As mass increases, the kinetic energy increases 
linearly.  
Even modest deformation of the aircraft skin or windshield can absorb all of that energy. Aluminum 
absorbs more energy before it fractures under impact than plexiglas. See Figure 16, 
http://www.kazuli.com/UW/4A/ME534/lexan%20VS%20Acrylic4.htm. Energy absorption of 
either is linearly proportional to thickness, for relatively thin structures. See David Roylance, 
Introduction to Fracture Mechanics at p. 11 (June 14, 2001), 
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/materials-science-and-engineering/3-11-mechanics-of-
materials-fall-1999/modules/frac.pdf [hereinafter "Roylance"]. 
On the other hand of 55 pound drone with a similar velocity would have 564,190 foot-poundals of 
energy, and a windshield or skin designed to withstand impacts with smaller objects cannot absorb that 
much energy without suffering penetration. 
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(3) The line of sight restriction 
The purpose of the line of sight restriction is to increase controllability. So long as the 
DROP can see the microdrone, he can fly it so as to avoid collisions with other aircraft 
and ground objects. He can keep it under control and navigate by watching it, without 
reliance on more sophisticated video systems installed on the drone and in his console. 
This restriction also makes it far more likely that the microdrone will remain within 
range of an inexpensive wireless control links at all times.  
(4) Commercial use restriction 
The statute, like the model-aircraft circular, excludes commercial operations. For 
commercial operations, a microdrone operator must obtain a special airworthiness 
certificate.101 Such certificates require aircraft registration, limit operations to a defined 
geographic area, require pilots to be certified at the private or higher level, and require 
transponders, among other things.102 Presently, special airworthiness certificates allow 
operations only for experimentation, data collection, and market development; not for 
routine operations. 
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial aviation operations makes 
sense when the operations being regulated involve the carriage of passengers. Then, the 
more stringent requirements for commercial operations under Parts 119, 135, and 121 
are necessary to protect paying passengers. 
Drones, of course, do not carry passengers. So this justification is absent for more 
stringent regulation of commercial drone operations.  
The scope of the existing regulations for commercial operations, however, suggests that 
the protection of passengers is not the only justification. Not only commercial passenger 
carriage, but also commercial cargo carriage, involves more stringent regulation.103 
                                                 
101  Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft, Order 
8130.34C, Para 11(b) (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentI
D/1021706 [hereinafter “Special Airworthiness Order”]. 
102  See Special Airworthiness Order § 1, para. 1 (registration); id., App. A, para. 3(b) (confined to defined 
area); id., App. A para 6(a) (pilot certification); id., App. A para. 7(b) (transponders). 
103  14 C.F.R. § 1.1 defines “commercial operator” as a “person who, for compensation or hire, engages in 
the carriage . . . of persons or property . . . .” 14 C.F.R. § 119.1 subjects commercial operators to the more 
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 Other justifications exist for applying higher standards to commercial operations. For 
one thing, economic incentives are likely to induce more operations. More aircraft will 
be flown and they will fly in more places.  
For another, research into aviation safety makes it clear that a pilot or other decision-
maker is more likely to fly into a risky situation when he does not want to lose the 
revenue for the flight, or face the prospect of losing his job or losing a contract if he 
makes to too many no-fly decisions. That is one of the justifications for introducing 
more stringent regulation of EMS operations in 2014, especially the requirement for 
operations control centers, limiting pilot authority to approve a flight on his own.104 
2. Integration of machodrones 
Machodrones will be regulated under an adaptation of the rules for manned aircraft 
including certification of aircraft types, pilots, mechanics and other crewmembers, and 
detailed flight rules. Differences also apparently will persist for regulation of "civil 
aircraft" as contrasted with "public aircraft" – those operated by units of federal, state, or 
local government. 
The concern that necessarily will receive the most attention is the fear that collisions will 
result because machodrones and manned aircraft will be unable to see each other. 
Concerns about aircraft and pilot standards can be addressed in a relatively 
straightforward manner by adapting current aircraft airworthiness certification and 
airmen certification requirements. Adapting the rules for collision avoidance requires 
much more fundamental rethinking of current flight rules. 
Developing flight rules necessarily invites close attention to features of machodrone 
flight that are unique, most obviously: the absence of a pilot in the cockpit. How can his 
sight picture, kinesthetic perception and control inputs be replicated from the ground? 
It is an extrapolation of fly-by-wire – over a very long wire, which is not even a wire. 
The regulatory regime for machodrones will be based on adaptation of the elaborate 
system for manned aircraft, comprising detailed standards and testing requirements for 
                                                                                                                                                             
stringent requirements of Parts 121 (air carriers), 125 (large aircraft), or 135 (commuter and on-demand 
operations) in addition to the more general requirements of Part 91. 
104  See 79 Fed.Reg. 9932, 9935 (noting that time sensitivity of EMS flights puts pressure on pilots to fly); 
Id. at 9949 (discussion need for management approval of flights exceeding certain risk levels); Id. at 9949-
9952 (discussing need for Operations Control Centers). 
45 
 
certification of specific models of aircraft ("types"), examination and licensing of those 
who want to become pilots and mechanics, and detailed flight rules. 105 In many 
respects, the process of adapting the existing rules will require rethinking many of 
them, some of which date back to the 1940s and 1950s. What risk are they meant to 
mitigate? Do they mitigate it in the most cost-effective manner, considering 
alternatives? Abundant opportunities for delay and controversy exist. 
a) Certification of aircraft and DROPs 
The 2012 Act requires the FAA to adopt rules to define standards for operation and 
certification of civil UAS. 106 Because the operating rules for microdrones and 
machodrones are almost certain to be quite different, the aircraft and airmen 
certification requirements should be different as well.  
(1) Aircraft 
Aircraft certification is intended to reduce the risk that that machodrone vehicles might 
be poorly designed or poorly manufactured, causing them to have unsafe flight 
characteristics or frequent failures of critical subsystems. 
No person may operate an aircraft in the NAS unless the aircraft has a type certificate 
and a certificate of airworthiness.107 The Roadmap says, "2. Civil UAS operating in the 
NAS obtain an appropriate airworthiness certificate while public users retain their 
responsibility to determine airworthiness.108 
The FAA's aircraft certification process begins with application for a type certificate.109 
An applicant is entitled to a type certificate if the applicant submits design, flight-test 
                                                 
105 The Roadmap says, "1. UAS operators [must] comply with existing, adapted, and/or new operating 
rules or procedures as a prerequisite for NAS integration.” It also says, "5. UAS [must] meet performance 
and equipage requirements for the environment in which they are operating and adhere to the relevant 
procedures.” The RTCA said, “And drone commercial operations will need to apply the operational 
control concept as appropriate for the type of operation, but with different functions applicable to drone 
operations.” The Roadmap says, "9. No new classes or types of airspace are designated or created 
specifically for UAS operations.”The RTCA said, “Drones will have access to the NAS, provided they 
have appropriate equipage and the ability to meet the requirements for flying in various classes of 
airspace . . . .” and “Routine drone operations will not require the creation of new special use airspace, or 
modification of existing special use airspace . . . .” 
106  Id. sec. 332(a)(2). 
107  CITE. 
108 The RTCA said, “Except for some special cases, such microdrones with very limited operational range, 
all drones will require design and airworthiness certification to fly civil operations in the NAS . . . .” 
109   14 C.F.R. § 21.15. 
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reports, and computations necessary to "show that the product to be certificated meets 
the applicable airworthiness, aircraft noise, fuel venting, and exhaust emission 
requirements of this subchapter and any special conditions prescribed by the FAA," and 
that "no feature or characteristic makes it unsafe for the category in which certification 
is requested."110 
For example, Part 27 prescribes the airworthiness standards for normal category 
rotorcraft.111 It addresses flight requirements,112 strength requirements,113 design and 
construction,114 powerplant,115 equipment,116 and operating limitations and 
information.117 In the flight category, the aircraft must demonstrate takeoff at maximum 
gross weight, with the most critical center of gravity, without exceptioning piloting 
skill, in a manner that allows a safe landing if the engine fails.118 Static longitudal and 
directional stability must be demonstrated.119 The structure must be designed to protect 
the occupants in an emergency landing involving upward loading of 4 Gs, forward 
loading of 16 Gs, and sideward loads of 8 Gs.120 A HV diagram must be constructed.121 
In each case, the burden is on the applicant to show that the candidate aircraft meets the 
requirements and that the aircraft can perform safely within a defined flight envelope. 
The flight envelope is defined as a part of the certificate and information about it must 
be disclosed in the form of instructions, requirements and limitations for pilots and 
                                                 
110   14 C.F.R. § 21.21. 
111   14 C.F.R. Pt. 27. 
112  Id. Subpart B. 
113  Id., subpart C. 
114  id. subpart D. 
115  Id. subpart E, 
116  Id., subpart F. 
117  Id., subpart G. 
118   14 C.F.R. § 27.51. 
119  Id. §§ 27.171-27.177. 
120   14 C.F.R. § 27.561(b)(3). 
121   14 C.F.R.§ 27.87. 
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mechanics. Typically, a completely new design gets a type certificate, specific to that 
model, and then subsequent modifications to the model get new airworthiness 
certificates with reference to the type certificate. Typically, the submissions to the FAA 
comprise detailed design specifications, theoretical calculations and flight test results. 
For example, height-velocity diagram familiar to all helicopter pilots results from flight 
tests in which the test pilot demonstrates his ability to set up an autorotation from 
various heights above the ground and ground speeds. His success in a series of 
maneuvers defines the outer envelope of the crosshatched or “avoid” area of the 
diagram. 
Certification of navigation and control systems are a demanding part of the aircraft 
certification process.122 
Familiar designs are easier to get accepted than completely novel ones. For example, the 
Learjet 85 has suffered delays in airworthiness certification because of the difficulty of 
proving acceptable characteristics of its composite-materials manufacturing process for 
the fuselage.123  
Airworthiness certificates are available as a matter of course for new aircraft 
manufactured under a type certificate if " the FAA finds after inspection that the aircraft 
conforms to the type design and is in condition for safe operation."124 The requirements 
for certification are quite detailed.125 
In the Frequently Asked Questions section of its website, the FAA answered the 
following question: 
                                                 
122  See generally Graham Warwick, Herk Works, Aviation Wk & Space Tech., Feb. 17, 2014 at p.35 
(reporting that certification of civilian version of Lockheed-Martin’s C-130J depends on system-by-system 
certification; engines and structure of aircraft already certificated). 
123  Matt Thurber, Learjet 85 schedule in doubt, Aviation International News, March, 
2014, at p.6. 
124   14 C.F.R. § 21.183(b). 
125  See, e.g. 14 C.F.R. §§ 27.2 (seatbelt and shoulder harness requirements); 27.33 (main rotor speed and 
pitch limits); 27.45 (specifying relative humidity and temperatures for calculation of performance figures); 
27.75 (imposing requirement for landings without excessive vertical acceleration or tendency to bounce); 
27.145 (prescribing speeds for which static stability must be demonstrated); 27.303 (prescribing factor of 
safety for structural design). 
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“"Currently, there are no means to obtain an authorization for commercial UAS 
operations in the NAS. However, manufacturers may apply for an experimental 
certificate for the purposes of R&D, market survey and crew training."126 
"How long does the process take to obtain an experimental certificate? 
From our experience, depending on the system and operational complexity, the process 
may take from 60 to 90 days."127  
For machodrones, their higher weight, and the idea that their operations would be 
integrated with manned aircraft, means that they should meet essentially the same 
certification requirements as manned aircraft, with the exception of those requirements 
that address the cockpit interface between pilot and aircraft. Those requirements should 
be replaced by suitable requirements for interface between drone and DROP display 
and between display and DROP. 
The most straightforward way to address certification of drones and DROPS is to 
establish a new category of aircraft known as “UAS” in addition to the existing 
categories such as airplane, rotorcraft, and lighter than air. Then, microdrones and 
machodrones would be defined as classes with the category. 
(2) DROPS 
Certification of pilots, mechanics and other crewmembers is intended to reduce the risk 
of insufficiently trained and disciplined operators, who can cause even well-designed 
aircraft to endanger the public. The 2012 Act requires the FAA to adopt rules to 
establish standards for licensing of UAS operators and pilots. 128  
The FAA aims at requiring UAS DROPs to satisfy manned-aircraft pilot standards to 
the extent feasible: 
                                                 
126  http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/uas_faq/#Qn4. See generally Airworthiness Certification of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft, (Order No. 8130.34C) (Aug. 2, 2013) 
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgOrders.nsf/0/10947CEE0052205886257BBE0057BD
76?OpenDocument  
127  Id. 
128  Id. sec. 332(a)(2). 
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"UAS training standards will mirror manned aircraft training standards to the 
maximum extent possible, including appropriate security and vetting requirements, 
and will account for all roles involved in UAS operation. This may include the pilot, 
required crew members such as visual observers or launch and recovery specialists, 
instructors, inspectors, maintenance personnel, and air traffic controllers."129 
Human factors issues in manned aviation are well known, but there needs to be further 
analyses regarding integration of UAS into the NAS. In the near-term, data will be 
collected to permit analysis of how pilots fly UAS, how controllers provide service 
involving a mix of manned aircraft and UAS, and how pilots and controllers interact 
with each other, with the goal of developing pilot, ATC, and automation roles and 
responsibilities concepts.  
Airman certification should be structured similar to aircraft certification. A new 
category, "drone operator,” would be established, paralleling the airplane, rotorcraft, 
and lighter than air category in the existing Part 61. Particular levels would be 
established within these categories, such as microdrone and machodrone, roughly 
paralleling single-engine and multi-engine ratings. An alternative would be simply to 
maintain the existing levels, recreational, private, commercial, and ATP, but the 
complexity of the throne and its control systems should matter more in the certification 
of airmen than the purpose for which it is flown. 
The airmen certification requirements for a microdrone DROPs should emphasize the 
rules and procedures that are pertinent to microdrone operations: keeping the drone in 
sight, limiting its height, and alternating DROP reference between the video display 
and visual reference to the drone. 
As for aircraft certification, the requirements for my machodrone DROP certification 
should resemble those for pilots of manned aircraft: with greater emphasis on 
procedures when the control link is lost and on use of the DROP’s video display to spot 
other aircraft and maintain situational awareness. 
b) Collision avoidance and NextGen 
Machodrone integration will be easier because of the basic requirements of the FAA’s 
“NextGen” initiative. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (“NextGen”) is a 
                                                 
129  Roadmap § 3.6 at p.28. 
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comprehensive plan for updating the National Airspace System to reflect new 
technologies. The 2012 Act requires that drone integration be part of the NextGen 
plan.130  
NextGen is defined in large measure by the essentiality of moving “from ground-based 
surveillance and navigation to more dynamic and accurate airborne-based systems and 
procedures . . . ."131 A central part of the NextGen environment is Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance ("ADS").132 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast ("ADS-B") 
comprises two different services: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out periodically 
broadcasts information about the aircraft on which it is installed, including current 
position, altitude, and velocity, derived from GPS. This information is intended to be 
received by ATC ground stations and other aircraft. ADS-B In receives and displays 
information received from other aircraft's ADS-B Out broadcasts, ADS-R, and TIS-B.133 
In a Final Rule promulgated in 2010134 the FAA required all aircraft operating in Class 
A, B, or C airspace, above 10,000 in Class E airspace, and within 30 miles of certain high-
density airports to be equipped with ADS-B Out.135 The required equipment must be 
operated in transmit mode at all times,136 and must transmit, once per second:137 
                                                 
130 Sec. 332(a)(2)(I), 2012 Act. 
131  ADS-B Final Rule at 30161. See also See FAA Proposed Rules, Docket No. FAA-2011-1082, 77 Fed.Reg. 
50420 (Aug. 21, 2012) (analyzing comments on FAA proposal to replace airways, routes, and procedures 
using VOR with RNAV and RNP systems). 
132 Ultimately, drone integration will also benefit from NextGen’s goal of greater reliance on digital 
communications for air traffic control. As a part of NextGen, voice communications  gradually will be 
replaced by digital communications through the Controller Pilot Data Link Communications ("CPDLC") 
system. MITRE paper at pp.1-1, 2-11. 
Certain elements of CPDLC messages can be directly loaded to Flight Management Systems ("FMS"). 
MITRE Report at p.2-11. Flight Management Systems are enhanced autopilots. 
As these digital systems are deployed, no particular technological challenge will be presented by 
integrating drones and providing for CPDLC messages to be exchanged with DROPs and drone 
autopilots. Full-scale deployment of CPDLC is not expected, however, until the 2020 timeframe. 
133 TIS-B collects information from primary and secondary ATC surveillance radars and broadcasts it for 
ADS-B In receivers. ADS-R collections traffic information from ADS-B Out broadcasts and rebroadcasts it 
for receipt by ADS-B In receivers. ADS-B Final Rule at 30161-30162 (describing ADS and its components). 
134  FAA, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance Requirements To 
Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, 75 Fed.Reg. 30160 (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter "ADS-B Final 
Rule"] 
135   14 CFR § 91.225(a), (b), and (d). Specifically, the regulation requires specific operators to be equipped 
with Extended Squitter (ES) ADS-B and Traffic information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) operating on the 
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• Three-dimensional position, including latitude and longitude 
• Velocity 
• Barometric pressure altitude 
• Length and width of the aircraft 
• Call-sign or registration number 
• ATC-assigned squawk code 
• IDENT when requested by ATC 
• Capability to indicate radio failure, emergency, or unlawful interference138 
The Rule also sets maximum error tolerances of 0.05 nautical miles for position and 10 
meters per second for velocity.139  
ADS-B is already having a significantly favorable impact on specialized domestic 
operations, such as helicopter support for oil and gas operations in the Gulf of 
Mexico.140 
The 2010 Rule did not require ADS-B In capability, but that is likely eventually—at least 
for those aircraft that must have collision-avoidance systems.  
In 2012, prices for a complete Garmin ADS-B Out and In package, installed, were about 
$23,000.  
ADS-B is the key technology for integrating drones into the NAS, but it is only a traffic 
conflict detection system; collision avoidance depends either on pilot action or collision 
                                                                                                                                                             
frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) and Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B equipment 
operating on the frequency of 978 MHz by January 1, 2020. 
136   14 C.F.R. § 225(f). 
137  The ADS-B Out broadcast occurs automatically, without the need for any query from a ground station 
or other aircraft. It also occurs without the knowledge of whether other aircraft or ground stations are 
receiving it. RTCA, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards For Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) § 1.2.1 at p.3 (June 24, 2002), 
http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/WG6_Meetings/Meeting%2016/WG6-WP16-04-
Working%20Draft_242B_Body_V1.pdf (description of ADS-B, its capabilities, and the infrastructures in 
which it can provide the basis for controlling air traffic). 
138   14 C.F.R. § 91.227(d) (setting minimum message elements). 
139   15 C.F.R. § 91.227(c). 
140  See FAA, NextGen is Platorm for Helicopter Flights, 
http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snapshots/stories/?slide=21 (reporting on impact of ADS-B on 5,000-9,000 
daily helicopter operations in Gulf of Mexico, enabling PHI to increase IFR flights from 1,500 hours 
annually to almost 20,000). 
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avoidance software layered on top of traffic conflict detection software. Airborne Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System ("TCAS") initially were developed and deployed before 
widespread availability of GPS,141 based on transponder signals from the conflicting 
aircraft. Transponders, however, do not provide information on direction of flight. 
Now GPS provides all the relevant data, including position, altitude, and direction and 
speed of flight. Two basic approaches have evolved. One gives urgent voice synthesizer 
commands to the flight crew. When the data is available, typical TCAS systems can 
issue synthetized voice commands such as: 
“Traffic! Traffic! Climb, Climb – Now” 
or 
“Traffic! Traffic! Descend, Descend – Now” 
And so on 
The second basic approach is to command the aircraft to perform evasive maneuvers 
without pilot intervention. For the second approach to be available, the aircraft must be 
equipped with an autopilot. Pilots generally disfavor the automatic approach because 
they do not want their aircraft to be programmed to make some abrupt maneuver that 
they have no way of expecting. 
With either approach, determining the protocols for collision avoidance is more 
challenging than programming the protocols into software. Suppose two aircraft are 
approaching head on. One of them dives to avoid the other, but the other dives as well 
and so they still collide. Lateral evasion is easier, as are head-on conflicts when there is 
some altitude separation or overtaking situations. For all of those, the FARs and the 
rules of the road prescribe what each aircraft must do. 
Adapting this technology to drones is straightforward. The challenges of getting the 
collision avoidance protocols right remain, but either the voice synthesized approach or 
the automatic evasive action approach is conceptually feasible. The urgent voice-
synthesized command can be given to the DROP, and he would fly the drone 
                                                 
141  See James K. Kuchar & Ann C. Drumm, The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 16 Lincoln 
Lab. J. 277 (2007), http://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/journal/pdf/vol16_no2/16_2_04Kuchar.pdf 
(summarizing history and development of TCAS). 
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appropriately, just has an onboard pilot would. Likewise, assuming the drone is 
equipped with autopilot, automatic evasive maneuvers can be triggered.  
Collision avoidance systems for drones will surely piggyback off the ongoing 
development of traffic detection and collision avoidance systems for manned aircraft as 
part of the NexGen effort. The Roadmap says, "4. All UAS [must be] equipped with 
ADS-B Out and transponder with altitude-encoding capability. This requirement is 
independent of the FAA’s rule-making for ADS-B Out.Traffic detection equipment 
promotes safety, especially if it is coupled with collision avoidance capability. It directly 
manages the risk of midair collisions, but it has nothing to do with avoiding threats to 
people or property on the ground, except by reducing the likelihood of collisions with 
other aircraft and resulting crashes of one or more of the aircraft  
Several challenges exist, however, in implementing requirements for drones that will 
permit them to be integrated into the NAS before 2020. Identifying and installing the 
necessary equipment in drones is not a major problem, although it will increase weight 
and cost. The traffic detection and avoidance hardware and software will be the same as 
is being developed for manned aircraft and discussed in § ___. The physical design will 
have to be different, however. Manned aircraft solutions place a premium on good 
graphical video displays in the cockpit. For drones, good graphical displays will have to 
be available to the DROP, not in the drone itself. So the interface among transceiver, 
processor, and display components will be different: hardwired and physically 
proximate in manned aircraft; wireless and remote in drones. That has implications for 
the necessary bandwidth in the communications link. It's one thing for the drone to 
send frequent updates on its own position and velocity vector down to the DROP; it's 
another thing for it also to send large amounts of position and velocity vector 
information about other aircraft. 
Second, is the question of how responsibility for collision avoidance will be divided 
between exercise of human judgment by the DROP and automatic evasive maneuvers 
programmed into the drone’s flight control system. Collision avoidance algorithms for 
manned general aviation aircraft is still in its relative infancy as part of NexGen. 
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Exercise of human judgment for collision avoidance is feasible, but its effectiveness 
depends on the capabilities of what the DROP sees142 and how quickly the drone can 
respond to his commands.143 
c) ATC communications 
The Roadmap preserves ATC authority to control access to airspace and ensure traffic 
separation, but without direct links to drones.144 DROPS must “compl[y] with all ATC 
instructions and use standard phraseology . . . .” Drones must comply with ATC 
clearances and instructions, including instructions that require visual reference,145 but 
the FAA identifies the following realities that must be considered: 
 “• The UAS pilot must depend on a data link for control of the aircraft. This affects the 
aircraft’s response to revised ATC clearances, other ATC instructions, or unplanned 
contingencies (e.g., maneuvering aircraft); 
“• UAS cannot comply with certain air traffic control clearances, and alternate means 
may need to be considered (e.g., use of visual clearances); 
“• And some UAS launch and recovery methods differ from manned aircraft and 
require manual placement and removal from runways, a lead vehicle for taxi 
operations, or dedicated launch and recovery systems.”146 
A drone with a ground operator can deal with voice communications, most likely by 
equipping the drone with the appropriate transceiver and antenna for ATC and air to 
air communications and then inserting those communications on the down link to the 
ground operator. The ground operator’s radio transmissions back to ATC or to other 
aircraft would be uplinked to the drone and transmitted by it. 
For example, a drone approaching airport for might get a tower instruction that says, 
"Extend your downwind leg until cleared to start base. You’re number two, to follow 
the Piper Arrow on long final. Advise when you have him in sight.” The DROP would 
examine his video display showing live video captured by cameras on the drone and 
                                                 
142  The DROP’s visual capability is considered in § ___. 
143  Replicating a pilot’s visual field of view is considered in § XXX. 
144 Roadmap, items 10-14. The RTCA said, “Drones will comply with ATC instructions, clearances, and 
procedures when receiving air traffic services . . . .” 
145  Roadmap at 17. 
146  Roadmap at 18-19. 
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respond by voice radio, “We’ll extend downwind. We have the traffic in sight.” Except 
for the two-stage radio link, and the fact that the DROP is on the ground, the 
transaction is the same as it would be for a manned aircraft in the same position. 
Similarly, for IFR operations, the question is not whether the drone autonomously can 
fly an IFR flight plan; it probably can, assuming it has a state-of-the-art autopilot. The 
question is how amended clearances would be transmitted—digitally to the drone, or 
verbally to the operator. 
d) See and avoid 
The core principle for reducing the risk of mid-air collisions between aircraft is “see-
and-avoid.” Pilots must keep a lookout for other aircraft and comply with various right-
of-way rules to avoid them. When weather conditions do not permit visual observation 
of other aircraft, a distinct regulatory regime shifts responsibility for traffic separation 
to air traffic controllers. Visual Flight Rules (“VFR") use see-and-avoid, supplemented 
by ATC instructions at busier airports and differing weather criteria for different types 
of airspace, depending on traffic density.147   Instrument Flight Rules ("IFR")148 apply 
when the weather is bad, or when a qualified pilot prefers to yield some of his 
autonomy to ATC. Each of these presents different challenges for integrating drones 
into the flow of manned aircraft traffic. The 2012 Act requires the FAA to adopt rules to 
require that all civil UAS include a "sense and avoid capability."149 
Under VFR,150 pilots may fly wherever they want, at whatever speeds and on headings 
they want. Certain geographically specific restrictions are imposed, however. A handful 
of prohibited areas exist, such as those over certain national facilities in Washington and 
over certain national defense facilities. Operation in prohibited areas requires advance 
permission from a controlling authority. 
IFR flight is permitted only pursuant to an IFR clearance,151 which specifies the precise 
route of flight, altitudes, and, in some cases, speeds. Typically, a pilot files an IFR flight 
                                                 
147  14 C.F.R. § 91.XXX. 
148   14 C.F.R. § 91.XXX. 
149  Id. sec. 332(a)(2). See Roadmap at 18-19 (identifying challenges). 
150 A pilot may elect to fly VFR whenever sky conditions provide more than three statute miles of 
visibility and ceilings of 1,000 feet above ground level or better. 
151 Pilots who have instrument ratings may fly IFR in IFR-equipped aircraft even when conditions are 
VFR. In Class A airspace, that airspace above 18,000 feet, only IFR is permitted. 
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plan through the Internet, on the telephone—or at a rapidly diminishing number of 
Flight Service Stations, by filling out a printed form and submitting it in person. Then, 
when he is ready to take off, he calls ATC on a frequency known as Clearance Delivery 
and receives his clearance, which may be the same as that filed or different. A typical 
IFR flight plan would read: 
It is not unusual for a pilot to receive one or more amendments to his IFR clearance 
enroute, to accommodate potentially conflicting traffic and changing weather 
conditions. 
The challenge for integrating drones into either VFR or IFR traffic is, not so much how 
to design and deploy systems that enable onboard computers to detect and to decide 
how to avoid traffic, but rather to understand what the human operator can perceive 
through his video link, whether he can detect conflicting traffic visually, or with the aid 
of onboard collision avoidance systems alerting him through the video link, and how 
quickly the data link will allow him to take evasive action. 
Instrument flight rules will be easier to adapt for machodrones then visual flight rules. 
See-and-avoid is not so central to IFR as it is to VFR. To sit in the cockpit, scan gauges 
and provide appropriate control imputs is not all that different from sitting on the 
ground doing the same thing. Of course the nature of the control link differs, extended 
much further, and rewiring on wireless radio instead of wired signals or mechanical 
linkages. 
The capability of drones to fly IFR flight plans does not mean, however, that IFR flight 
plans should be required. The Roadmap says, "3. All UAS must file and fly an IFR flight 
plan.” This is manifestly infeasible if full drone capabilities are to be available. Filing 
and adhering to an IFR flight plan is completely incompatible with useful law-
enforcement or ENG missions. Instead of being point-to-point flights of relatively long 
distances, well-suited for IFR clearances, law-enforcement and ENG machodrones must 
follow unpredictable routes and be able to change position quickly. Requiring them to 
obtain an amended IFR clearance every time they want to move around would make 
mission performance impossible. 
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e) Special drone arrival and departure procedures 
The National Airspace System can handle drone traffic with proper procedures. Special 
rules of the air exist, much like rules of the road, to keep the flow of traffic moving 
efficiently, and, more importantly, special procedures limit risk in congested airspace. 
Currently aircraft arrival and departure procedures are used 24/7 to keep the flow of air 
traffic flying smoothly in the vicinity. Such procedures expedite the flow of traffic and 
minimize radio congestion in and around busy airports. Airborne routes such as 
instrument approaches map a route for aircraft to fly into airports providing altitudes, 
headings and speeds. These instrument approaches provide terrain and obstacle 
clearance.  
Drone arrival routes would be structured similar to that of an instrument approach or 
departure procedure.  Utilizing a “plate” a DROP would simply taxi the drone to a pre-
approved departure point on the airfield. When ready for departure the DROP would 
call ATC providing a tail number and name of the departure plate. ATC would clear the 
aircraft for the departure. From then on very limited radio communication, if any, 
would be needed. Traffic, obstacle separation would not be an issue because of the pre-
determined route.  
Depicted arrival/departure procedures would be published by the same methods under 
which current charts are published.152 
The basic concept resembles that presently in the FARs for helicopter flight into and out 
of and in the vicinity of airports with significant fixed wing traffic.153 Typically, at a 
tower-operated airport, helicopters receive clearances to operate directly from ramps 
and taxiways, while fixed wing aircraft use the runways. These helicopter rules are not 
mandatory and usually are defined on an ad hoc basis in radio communications 
between an air traffic controller and helicopter pilot.  
                                                 
152  See generally FAA, Aeronautical Information Manual § 5-4-1 (STARs); id. § 5-2-8 
(DPs) (2014). 
153 For example, 14 CFR § 91.126(b) prescribes traffic patterns for fixed wing aircraft 
operating at airports without control towers, while simply saying that helicopters must 
be operated so as to “avoid the flow of fixed wing aircraft.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.126(b)(2). 
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Also, in major cities, the FAA publishes helicopter charts that show nonbinding 
"preferred routes" over expressways or other prominent ground features which ease the 
burden on air-traffic controllers and pilots when helicopters fly these routes.154 
These special rules for helicopters embrace the idea that aircraft with significantly 
different flight characteristics can be separated without much burden on either type of 
aircraft. They represent a model for doing the same thing with drones. 
f) Fail-safe protocols 
For about 80 years, a central philosophy of traffic separation in the NAS has been based 
on knowing what to expect from other aircraft. This is a philosophy inherited from rules 
of the road for maritime navigation. It is as important that the vessel with the right-of-
way assert its right-of-way155 as it is for the vessel obligated to give way to alter course. 
In its application to aviation, an aircraft being overtaken has the right-of-way, and the 
overtaking aircraft must alter course to the right. The overtaken aircraft, having the 
right-of-way, must maintain its course.  
So also when in-flight emergencies or less urgent incidents occur. An IFR flight losing 
radio communications is obligated to fly the last clearance.156 An aircraft experiencing 
an emergency necessitating deviation from an ATC clearance may deviate as 
necessary,157 but must inform ATC by radio as soon as it can do so safely.158 
One of the challenges for integrating drones into the NAS is to prescribe rules for 
drones experiencing emergencies that let everyone else – other aircraft and controllers – 
know what to expect. The first step an outlining such an approach is to identify what 
might happen that would constitute an emergency. The following incidents clearly 
belong to any list: 
• Propulsion plant failure 
                                                 
154  See, e.g. FAA, Chicago Helicopter Route Chart (21 October 2010) (depicting “Des 
Plaines” standard route through O’Hare Class B airspace). 
155  See http://www.boatus.com/foundation/guide/navigation_3.html (stand-on vessel--the one with the 
right of way--must maintain current course and speed until burdened vessel has passed). 
156   14 C.F.R. § 91.185(c). 
157   14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b). 
158  FAA, Airman’s Information Manual (“AIM”) § 1 at p. 835. 
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• Loss of control link 
• Loss of control while the control link is maintained 
• Impairments to visibility 
• Loss of navigational datalink 
• Loss of voice communications through the drone 
The responses should be different depending on whether the DROP is still able to 
control the drone. If he is unable to control the drone because of a loss of the control link 
or for other reasons, three options are possible.  
• The drone lands immediately 
• The drone returns to its starting point 
• The drone follows the last flight plan that was agreed to with ATC.  
Whether returning to base or continuing to fly the flight plan is feasible depends on 
endurance remaining. The DROP should know remaining endurance before he lost 
contact. 
Landing immediately or returning to the starting point represents a deviation from 
what is expected by nearby users of the airspace. That means that some mechanism is 
necessary to alert the others to the drone’s intentions or at least to alert them to the fact 
that the drone is in distress. A standard way of doing that for manned aircraft is for the 
pilot to transmit a radio call, either "Mayday, Mayday Mayday," for a serious 
emergency or "Pan, Pan, Pan," for a less urgent incident. In addition, if the aircraft is 
transponder equipped, the pilot must squawk 7700 for an emergency or 7600 for a radio 
communications failure.159 Any drone capable flying outside the line of sight of the 
DROP will be transponder equipped, and its on board flight control systems can be 
programmed to set a special transponder code when one of the listed incidents occurs. 
A lost communications link is one obvious trigger for an emergency procedure. 
Indicative of the FAA's approach to lost-link procedures is this passage from the order 
for special airworthiness certificates: 
“In the event of lost link, the UA must provide a means of automatic recovery that 
ensures airborne operations are predictable and that the UA remains within the flight 
                                                 
159  AIM § 6-2-2. 
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test area. The chase aircraft or observer, all other UAS control stations, and the 
appropriate ATC facility must be immediately notified of the lost link condition and the 
expected UA response. Comply with the following provisions: 
“(1) If lost link occurs within a restricted or warning area, or the lost link procedure 
takes the UA into a restricted or warning area, the aircraft will not exit the restricted or 
warning area until the link is re-established. 
“(2) The UA lost link mission will not transit or orbit over populated areas. 
“(3) Lost link programmed procedures will avoid unexpected turn-around and/or 
altitude changes and will provide sufficient time to communicate and coordinate with 
ATC. 
“(4) Lost link orbit points will not coincide with the centerline of published airways."160 
B. Six FAA test regions 
The 2012 Act requires the FAA to establish pilot projects at six test ranges 161 to conduct 
research and development in operational settings to support its eventual requirements 
for aircraft and airman certification and flight rules. The test range program is to 
continue until 2017, with a report to Congress within 90 days after its termination.162 
On 30 December 2013, the FAA selected six test sites for drone research and 
development.163 Each has a particular area of focus 
• University of Alaska-standards for unmanned aircraft categories, state 
monitoring and navigation, and UAS operations. 
• State of Nevada- UAS standards and operations, operator standards and 
certification requirements; evolution of air traffic control procedures. 
• New York’s Griffiss International Airport- test, evaluation, verification and 
validation processes under FAA safety oversight; sense and avoid capabilities. 
                                                 
160  Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft, Order 
8130.34C, Para 11(b) (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentI
D/1021706. 
161  § 332(c)(1) Pub.L. 112–95 
162  Roadmap at 60. 
163  http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsid=15576. 
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• North Dakota Department of Commerce- airworthiness essential data, validation 
of high reliability link technology; and human factors research.  
• Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi- system safety requirements and 
protocols and procedures for airworthiness testing.  
• Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech)- failure mode 
testing and identification of operational and technical risks areas.164 
The test site approach is logical and should result in much useful data and analysis, 
helping to crystallize regulatory approaches. It will be an impediment, however, if the 
FAA defers all other proposals for drone testing until 2017. 
Moreover, if the FAA requires the six test site operators to obtain certificates of 
airworthiness for microdrone testing, and if it is inflexible in adapting the published 
requirements,165 the test site program may not provide much useful information about 
microdrones.166 
C. Regulatory timeline realities 
As of early 2014, the FAA had released its Congressionally mandated Comprehensive 
Plan for integrating drones into the NAS,167 its first annual "UAS Roadmap," 
summarizing regulatory steps to integrate drone operations into the national airspace,168 
a final privacy policy for the six UAS test sites,169 and conducted an online public-
engagement session on privacy issues arising from drone use.  
Serious drone-related activity by manufacturers, operators and end users will not occur 
until the regulatory framework for drones exists. While the 2012 Reform Act imposes 
                                                 
164  Id. 
165  See § ___. 
166  See § XXX regarding unsuitability of current special airworthiness requirements for microdrones. 
167  See Joint Planning and Development Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Comprehensive Plan:  
A Report on the Nation’s UAS Path Forward  (Sep. 2013) [hereinafter “Comprehensive Plan”], 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.
pdf. The Committee comprised representatives from the Department of Transportation, the FAA, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Commerce, NASA, 
and the Executive Office of the President. 
168  http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/. 
169  Id. 
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various deadlines for the FAA’s integration of drones into the NAS, it is not uncommon 
for agencies to miss statutory deadlines for rulemaking.170 
The FAA’s Comprehensive Plan sets the following deadlines: 
• Routine public small UAS (microdrone) Visual Line-of-Sight (VLOS) operations 
in the NAS without COAs, by 2015. These operations would be permitted only 
outside of Class B/C airspace and not over populated areas.  
• Routine civil microdrone VLOS operations in the NAS without special 
airworthiness certificates, by 2015. Such operations would not be allowed in 
Class B/C airspace or over populated areas.  
• Routine public drone operations in the NAS by 2015, initially using mitigation to 
comply with 14 CFR Part 91 requirements, and eventually under revised 
operating requirements addressing unique drone attributes.  
• Routine civil UAS Operations in the NAS by 2020, initially using mitigation to 
comply with 14 CFR Part 91 requirements, and eventually meeting revised 
operating requirements addressing unique drone attributes. 171 
The FAA Roadmap sets a goal of 2014 for release of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“NPRM”).172 The FAA might meet this deadline, so December 31, 2014 is a reasonable 
estimate for release of the NPRM. From that point forward, it is reasonable to use the 
timing of the FAA’s most recent final rule making significant changes in the FARs as a 
baseline from which to project timing for the drone-integration rule. The FAA issued its 
NPRM for air ambulance operations on October 12, 2010, with a comment deadline 
about 90 days later, on January 10, 2011.173 It then took three years and one month to 
consider the comments and to promulgate the final rule.  
                                                 
170  For example the 2012 Act set a deadline of July 1, 2012 for air ambulance rules, but the final rules 
were not promulgated until February 21, 2014. See Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, 
and Part 91 Helicopter Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. 9932 (Feb. 21, 2014) [hereafter “Air Ambulance Rules”] 
(referring to Congressional deadline). 
171  Comprehensive Plan at pp. 9-10. 
172  Comprehensive Plan at p. 15. An NPRM is the first formal step in the promulgation of regulations by 
an administrative agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing for “notice and comments” rulemaking). 
173  Air Ambulance Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. at 9936. 
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Extrapolating from this experience to the drone-integration rulemaking,174 one could 
expect the following: 
NPRM released 31 December 2014175 
Comment period closes in 90 days 1 April 2015 
Evaluation of comments takes six months to 
three years176 
 
Final Rule 1 October 2015 to 31 January 2018 
Drone proponents are not going to remain passive while the rulemaking proceeds. They 
will continue their development and testing work, many in conjunction with test-site 
operators. Some operators and end users will participate in these activities and refine 
their economic and operational analyses as more data becomes available. The existence 
of the advisory committee represents a channel through which the FAA’s evolving 
intentions will be relatively transparent to the most interested parties, as the agency 
evaluates comments, which are unlikely to deviate much from the RIAC consensus 
guidelines. As draft regulations become more specific, however, agreement on broad 
principles is likely to erode and sharper disagreements to emerge. 
In any event, commercial and public use drone operations will not be legal, except 
under one-off COAs and special airworthiness certificates until late 2015, and perhaps 
not until early 2018. 
                                                 
174  While the drone-integration rules are more sweeping than the Air Ambulance Rules, they affect new 
entrants more directly than existing participants in the NAS, and thus the prospect of intense opposition 
to protect vested interests is less likely than for the Air Ambulance Rules, which stiffened requirements 
imposed on existing operators. Both rulemaking activities were and are supported by well-structured 
industry advisory committees. The drone-integration committee already has reached consensus on the 
basic features of drone integration. See § ___ (describing RIAS and summarizing its guidelines). Likewise 
an Aviation Rules Committee was convened for the Air Ambulance Rules made consensus 
recommendations to the FAA in 2005. Air Ambulance Rules 57 Fed. Reg. at 9935. 
175 The Roadmap calls for release of a microdrone NPRM in early 2014 and release of a more general 
NPRM for drone integration in 2014. Roadmap at 58-59. 
176  It is possible that the FAA would issue a final rule on some issues, and ask for further comments on 
other parts of it. If that occurs, it could reduce the evaluation period toward the six-month low end for 
some aspects of the rule and extend it beyond the high end for other aspects. It also is possible that 
judicial review over some aspects of the rule would delay its implementation further. 
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IV. Realities 
How soon drones become a regular feature of air commerce depends on a complex 
interplay among technology development, regulatory constraints, entrepreneurship, 
demand and supply interaction, and politics. 
A. Supply chain 
The market is in its infancy. A handful of suppliers are selling rotary wing microdrones 
to law enforcement agencies and advertising them for ENG and pipeline and powerline 
patrol. The civilian category currently comprises only microdrones. It is likely to stay 
that way until certification requirements for larger civilian drones crystallize in the 
2018-2019 time period. 
Even before the FAA finalizes the safe harbor for microdrones and well before 
requirements for machodrones crystallize, however, the pipeline is beginning to fill. 
Flint Hills Systems, for example, offers a family of drones, from microdrones at the low-
end to two machodrones. It is actively promoting them for powerline patrol, law 
enforcement, and ENG. The designs are conventional, in the sense that they involve one 
main rotor and the tail rotor in all four configurations.177 
The level of activity is greater for fixed-wing machodrones. In October, 2013, the FAA 
granted a special airworthiness certificate to Applied Research Associates, Inc. for its 
Nighthawk IV fixed-wing microdrone operating at its Randolph, VT location for the 
purposes of research and development, customer demonstrations, and crew training.178 
The company is advertising the availability of the Nighthawk IV for public safety 
agencies that can use data generated by the manufacturer to expedite issuance of a 
COA.179 Earlier in 2013, the FAA issued restricted category type certificates for the Scan 
Eagle X200 and Aero Vironment's PUMA permitting them to conduct aerial 
reconnaisance pertinent to wildlifre surveillance and oil spill monitoring, and ice flows 
and migrating whales in Arctic oil exploration areas. The drones are fixed-wing and 
weigh about 55 pounds.180 
                                                 
177  http://fhsllc.com/ 
178  http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/10/prweb11228997.htm. 
179  Id. 
180  http://rt.com/usa/us-drones-civilian-use-685/ 
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It is likely that major manufacturers such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Grumman 
will adapt their military versions for civilian application but the nature of these 
adaptations is still murky. 
For the near-term, the greatest level of product design and sales activity will be limited 
to the microdrone segment. Then, as regulatory aircraft certification, airmen 
certification, and flight rules for operations mature, manufacturers will be able to 
crystallize their plans for machodrones. 
B. Labor market 
Significant deployment of civilian drones depends also on the availability of DROPs 
and other qualified personnel. Presently, the view is that DROPs need essentially the 
same training as pilots for manned aircraft. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University has 
added UAS training and degrees to its long-standing aviation education programs.181 
The curricula of the handful of other universities-- Kansas State,182 Northern 
Michigan,183 and the University of North Dakota184 are offering UAS degrees185-- that 
have established degree programs for DROPS are similar to Embry-Riddle’s: they are 
modifications of traditional pilot-oriented degree programs with the addition of three 
or four courses specifically concerning unmanned aircraft systems. The pipeline will be 
augmented, of course, by DROPs being discharged from the armed forces. 
The equilibrium between supply and demand in the labor market for the relevant skills 
is hard to estimate until more progress is made on regulatory initiatives and until 
manufacturers ramp up their production. Prices and capabilities in the product market 
will, of course, influence demand in the law-enforcement, ENG, and utility-industry 
segments. They have to decide how active their drone operations will be before they 
know their hiring plans. 
                                                 
181  See http://daytonabeach.erau.edu/coa/aeronautical-science/undergraduate-degree/unmanned-aircraft-
systems-science/index.html(describing pilot and non-pilot tracks and 
degrees); http://catalog.erau.edu/daytona-beach/aviation/bachelors/unmanned-aircraft-systems/ (listing 
specific course requirements). 
182  http://www.salina.k-state.edu/aviation/uas/Salina%20uas.pdf 
183  https://www.nmc.edu/programs/academic-programs/aviation/uas-courses.html 
184  http://aviation.und.edu/ProspectiveStudents/Undergraduate/uasops.aspx. 
185  See also http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/education/edlife/universities-offer-degrees-in-
unmanned-aircraft-systems.html?_r=0. 
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The aviation community has already entered a period of pilot shortages, as the Viet 
Nam era generation of pilots accelerates its retirement and fewer young people are 
beginning pilot training. This means that drone operators and the institutions the train 
DROPs will have to compete with manned flying opportunities for the same pool of 
potential commercial pilots. There is a possibility, that the lure of flying drones will 
attract a new group of people are not interested in becoming pilots of manned aircraft, 
but this is entirely speculative, and even if such attraction exists, demanding training 
requirements may discourage the potential new entrants.186 
The labor market for DROPS will be significantly influenced by the attitudes of 
helicopter pilots toward drones. Pilots have outsized, but not determinative, influence 
on public policy relating to aviation. They have enormous influence on young people 
considering careers in aviation. The pilot community is generally opposed to drones, 
because of a perception that their use will diminish opportunities for pilots, and pilots 
enjoy flying manned aircraft. In the context of this article, helicopter pilots fear that 
their jobs are in jeopardy if drones gain a toehold.  And they are not drawn in the least 
to DROP jobs. “Who wants to sit on the ground and fiddle with a videogame console 
while the aircraft flies around without you?”  
The fear that their jobs are at risk is neither in their self interest nor backed up by 
reality. For the first few years of operational drone use, no pilot’s job will be at risk. It 
will be years or decades before any customer starts canceling helicopter contracts or 
selling helicopters because its needs can be covered by drones.  
Attitudes toward new technologies are generational. Already a new generation is ready 
to enter the pilot workforce. They have grown up with drones being part of any 
conversation about aviation and aviation careers. The generation ahead of them feels 
blindsided by the threat of drones just as they get a leg up on getting paid to be in the 
cockpit. The reaction of the two groups is likely to be quite different. Older generations 
of pilots—those in their forties and fifties have retirement within their planning 
horizons. Their attitude is likely to be, “Just stave off the drones until I am ready to 
retire.”  
                                                 
186  It may turn out that microdrones operating within line of sight and at limited altitudes likely will be 
operated by regular police officers, reporters, or utility inspection personnel with modest on-the-job 
training. This would ease the barriers to recruitment in the microdrone segment. 
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C. Political factors 
The pace with which drones will be deployed will depend as much on politics and 
privacy concerns as on technology and FAA regulation.  
1. Privacy concerns 
The privacy community is up in arms about the potential for drones to expand 
intrusion into private affairs by law enforcement, foreign intelligence, and journalistic 
organizations. The FAA’s online telephonic session on privacy issues relating to the test 
sites illustrated some of the concerns. 
Those focusing on privacy identified the perceived threats: 
"[U]se as evidence in a  criminal court of law, . . .videotaping the facial expressions of 
people on  the ground from hundreds of feet in the air. [It] will usher in a new age of 
surveillance in our society.  No person, whether he is at a political rally, exiting a house 
of worship or simply walking around downtown will be safe from the prying eyes of these 
devices."187 
EFF summarized the privacy threats: 
“UAS are capable of highly advanced and near-constant surveillance through live-feed 
video cameras, thermal imaging, communications intercept capabilities, and backend 
software tools such as license plate recognition, GPS tracking, and facial recognition. . . . 
They can amass large amounts of data on private citizens, which can then be linked to 
data collected by the government and private companies in other contexts.”188 
CDT summarizes it this way: 
“Surveillance-capable UASs are quite different than manned aircraft and other types of 
surveillance activities for a number of reasons. First, platforms for UAS based 
surveillance are increasingly inexpensive, with small systems costing a few hundred 
dollars, compared to many thousands of dollars per hour of operation for manned 
surveillance aircraft such as airplanes and helicopters. Because of their small size and lack 
of an on-board human pilot, UASs are capable of going many places manned aircraft 
                                                 
187  Michael Covari, FAA UAS Online Listening Session, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uastranscription.pdf [hereinafter "Privacy Transcript"] at 
p.4. 
188  Maas, Three Requirements. 
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cannot (such as between narrow buildings) and capable of operation in environments that 
humans cannot (such assuring high-g tactical maneuvers, high altitudes and long times 
aloft). UASs, like manned surveillance aircraft, are capable of unique vantage points from 
which ground-based individuals may not expect surveillance systems to observe. Finally, 
the nexus of these considerations result in aerial surveillance platforms that may be very 
difficult – if not impossible – to visually identify, such that many types of UAS 
surveillance are possible with no notice to ground-based individuals.”189  
Another privacy concern is that widespread use of drones will make it easy to monitor 
crowds and other public gatherings that have First Amendment implications.  
Support is growing for a requirement that drone operators file and adhere to data 
collection and management plans. Such plans would include: 
“• The purpose for which the UAS will be used and the circumstances under which its 
use will be authorized and by whom, 
“• The specific kinds information the UAS will be capable of collecting, including 
whether that information is personally identifiable or not, 
“• The length of time for which the information will be retained (in a manner that 
preserves identifying data), 
“• Methods used to minimize or aggregate data and delete old data, 
“• Parties with which information will be shared, 
“• The possible impact on individuals’ privacy, 
“• The specific steps the operator will take to mitigate the impact on individuals’ 
privacy, including protections against unauthorized disclosure, 
“• The individual responsible for safe and appropriate use of the UAS, and 
“• An individual point of contact for citizen complaints.” 
                                                 
189  CDT, Comments to the Federal Aviation Administration on Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site 
Program 1-2 (Apr. 23, 2013), https://www.cdt.org/files/file/CDTComments_FAA-UAS.pdf [hereinafter 
"CDT Privacy Comments"]. 
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Many critics would require search warrants.190 This may not provide much protection, 
however, because search warrants are required only of governmental entities, and the 
"open fields" doctrine says that warrants are not required to conduct surveillance of 
activities going on in public areas. 
Widespread support exists for making data collection and distribution transparent. 
Some would require that any downlink be unencrypted and represented in standard 
data structures so that anyone could see what is being collected. 
Others would make metadata about drone collection available on the web, perhaps for 
each flight--route of flight, time and date, targets of collections efforts, and amount of 
data being collected. 
EPIC recommends a searchable database for drones and drone operators.191A more 
modest proposal, not aimed at data collection itself, but rather at drone flights, would 
simply require drones to have ADS-B Out capability, which would permit anyone to 
track them.  
Significantly, CDT would exempt microdrones: 
“Certainly, the traditional exemptions for model aircraft operation and the current 
unregulated airspace below 400 feet should still allow relatively simple UAS operations 
without such equipment requirements; however, if the UAS has sufficient power and 
recording capability, it should also be able to generate an ADS-B Out signal.  
Privacy fears will continue to dominate the political calculus. In many respects, the 
privacy concerns are unfocused, reflecting a lingering conspiracy theory about “black 
helicopters" as the wedge of a crushing state intruding into individual activities. But 
                                                 
190  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against governmental invasions of 
privacy; no such legal provision protects against private invasion. Accordingly, the legal framework for 
privacy protection with respect to law-enforcement use of drones is more robust than it is otherwise. 
The basic concept of the Fourth Amendment is that the government may not intrude into areas clothed 
with a “reasonable expectation of privacy" without a search warrant, absent other circumstances that 
make the intrusion "reasonable." Search warrants may be obtained only upon showing a probable cause 
to believe that evidence pertinent to a criminal investigation will be obtained by the search and only then 
subject to conditions that minimize the intrusion. 
191  EPIC, Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center to the Federal Aviation Administration, 
Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program 10 (Apr. 23, 2013), http://epic.org/privacy/drones/EPIC-
Drones-Comments-2013.pdf [hereinafter “EPIC Comments”] 
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some of them are more focused and susceptible of factual analysis. The starting point is 
to understand what drones are likely to do that manned aircraft are unlikely to do in the 
hands of the same types of operators. 
There are differences. It is widely perceived that drones will be much cheaper than 
manned aircraft and therefore that there will be many more of them. As section XXX 
explains, however, these hopes are likely to be dashed on the shoals of regulatory 
reality. But that remains to be seen. If there are many more drones, the possibilities of 
using them to invade personal privacy increases linearly, in proportion to their 
numbers. 
Of greater moment is the near certainty that drones will be flown much lower than 
manned aircraft. Prudent helicopter pilots stay at a height above ground level that 
permits a safe landing in the event of an engine failure. Flying higher also decreases the 
likelihood of colliding with obstructions such as radio antennas, water towers, electrical 
wires, and wind turbines. This particular safety concern is diminished with drones 
because an accident does not threaten the lives of the aircrew. It may, of course, from 
the lives of people on the ground. The prevailing view is that lower is better for drone 
flight to reduce potential conflicts with manned aircraft, most of which are flying 
higher. At least until low-flying drone accidents occur and the public demands 
minimum altitudes, flying low will be a reality.  
The privacy concern is that, by flying lower, drones will be able to intrude more closely 
and private lives. The typical cartoon highlighting this concern depicts a small drone, 
hovering and looking through a bedroom window. 
To some extent, the concern with height above ground is misplaced. Good onboard 
camera equipment is capable of zooming so that intimate detail of ground objects is 
clearly visible from heights of 1,000 feet AGL or so. On the other hand, to focus on the 
looking through the bedroom window fear, sight angles matter. ENG and law 
enforcement helicopters usually find it a 45° offset ideal to capture ground detail.192 At 
that angle, one cannot see much through a bedroom window--except the floor. 
                                                 
192  See Perritt, Sprague, and Cue at XXX. 
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In contrast, a drone hovering at 10 feet, 20 feet from the side of a single-family detached 
dwelling, can see almost anything going on inside a room through an unobscured 
window, if the drone is positioned at roughly the same height as an exterior window. 
An important aspect of how the law protects privacy is the likelihood of detecting 
violations. Peeping toms are often caught, because they make noise, can be seen without 
too much difficulty, and can run only so fast when they try to get away. Drones, even 
small electrically powered ones, make a fair amount of noise, so detection is equally 
probable. On the other hand, they can fly away very fast, and the likelihood of catching 
them is low unless the victim is quick enough to capture detail and unless the 
regulatory system tracks their movements. It will be relatively easy to track the 
movements of larger drones – those equipped with ADS-B Out systems.193 On the other 
hand, microdrones are unlikely to be required to have such systems and therefore the 
mechanism for tracking them will not be very robust. 
Independently, privacy advocates are concerned about the use of data collected by 
drones. It is one thing for a trusted agency to have an inventory of data about a citizen; 
it is quite another if the same data fall into the hands of an employer, an insurer, or a 
blackmailer. 
There will be continuing battles between privacy groups and ordinary citizens 
concerned about privacy and proponents of wider drone use. While the proposals for 
data collection plans and open access to ADS-B Out data are reasonable on their face, 
potential operators will oppose the data collection plans because they will impose 
additional paperwork burdens and restrict operations. Many of them also will oppose 
transparency in ADS-B Out data on law-enforcement-security or proprietary grounds. If 
anyone can know the exact flight path of law-enforcement drones, they can frustrate the 
law-enforcement mission. If competitors know the details of ENG drone flights, they 
can gain a competitive advantage. Indeed, such data meet most of the elements for 
trade secret status.194 Whether the secrecy element can be met depends on how 
transparent the data transmissions are. 
                                                 
193  See § XXX. 
194  See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Trade Secrets for the Practitioner § ___ (2014) (summarizing elements of trade 
secret misappropriation: (1) information conferring competitive advantage because not generally known, 
(2) reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, and (3) wrongful means to obtain). 
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2. The political calculus 
It is early to predict with any confidence the values and variables in the political 
calculus for widespread drone use. Nevertheless, the FAA-sponsored “public listening 
session”195 over the test sites provides a reasonable snapshot of the political equation as 
of the end of 2013 and early 2014. That session had the following characteristics: 
Proponents and opponents of widespread drone use were about evenly split, with a 
slight tilt toward proponents. 
All of the major privacy advocacy groups participated and demonstrated a high level of 
sophistication about the issues. They all made similar proposals with regard to privacy 
protection. Many of the concerns focused, however, not on privacy, but on safety—the 
prospect of drones falling out of the sky--as much as drones at the bedroom window. 
"At this  point I am less concerned with the privacy issue. I am more concerned with 
safety with mid air  collisions between a UAV and a manned aircraft and pieces of 
aircraft debris falling from the  sky."196 
"[T]he thought of running into a 400 pound UAV that’s 400 feet around my airport is 
very very  scary and I don’t want that to happen in my air space."197 
"How would you feel if a 45 foot wingspan drone came crashing to the ground in  one of 
your elementary schools? . . . [think about] other accidents such as a 400  pound shadow 
drone crashing into a C130 Hercules transport plane."198 
As is typical with such opportunities for general public participation, several of the 
individual participants had overblown concerns or fixations on bizarre solutions to 
general social problems. One participant, who called in twice, favored wider use of 
drones as instruments of the constitutional right to self defense, which, he claimed, 
would diminish gun violence and generally improve society. 
Most of the proposals for privacy protections were rational, in the sense that they would 
diminish the opportunities for intrusion, or at least make targets aware of it. They 
                                                 
195  See FAA UAS Online Listening Session, April 3, 2013, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAStranscription.pdf [hereinafter “Privacy Transcript”] 
196  Alice Sheflaw, Privacy Transcript at p.7. 
197  David Lemmon, Privacy Transcript at p.10. 
198  Shirley Mikinott, Privacy Transcript at p.7. 
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demonstrate a realization that the greatest threat comes from law-enforcement 
collection, and that considerable benefits result from other uses, such as for 
newsgathering. 
Here is how the EFF summarized the status of state legislation in mid-2013: 
"Some proposals floated so far, such as California’s AB 1327, lay out a decent 
framework for limiting the use of drones by law enforcement. Few states, however, 
have adequately handled the use of drones by private individuals. Texas' recently 
passed (but so far unsigned) HB 912 manages to mess up both sides of the table by 
allowing cops to use drones without a warrant while also hampering the press' ability 
to use drones in newsgathering. The ACLU has a comprehensive breakdown of the 
legislation, along with analysis of the good and the bad and what has passed into law so 
far."199 
EFF argues that the following principles should govern state legislation: 
1. Law enforcement must be required to obtain warrants before using drones in 
investigations to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens from 
overbroad or undue data collection.  
2. Commercial drone operators must be held to established privacy standards and 
must disclose the details of their operations.  
3. Legislation that regulates private and media use of drones must strike an 
appropriate balance between privacy and First Amendment protected activities 
such as newsgathering. 
“EFF believes that the public has a right to know where drones are being used, what 
kind of information the surveillance technology records, how long the data will be 
stored, who has access to the data and whether the information can be used outside of 
the original, stated purposes."200 
It is tempting to conclude that exciting new technologies cannot be held back, but they 
can. Political opposition based on noise and other environmental effects killed the 
                                                 
199  Dave Maass, All Drone Legislation Must Meet These Three Requirements (June 3, 
2013),https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/all-drone-legislation-must-meet-these-three-requirements 
[hereinafter Maass, Three Requirements”]. 
200  Maass, Three Requirements. 
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supersonic transport. XXX’s book, THE GOD MACHINE, meticulously details how the 
prospects for helicopters and gyrocopters to be a pervasive part of everyday life have 
repeatedly been derailed by political opposition to noise, safety risks, and economic 
disparity. 
But a coalition of supporters is possible. Significant to evaluating the political equation, 
however, is the fact that Congress has been pushing the FAA to accelerate drone 
integration rather than pulling it back. The inclusion of the push in the 2012 Reform and 
Revitalization Act suggests constituencies influential with the Aviation Committee are 
the most active. A review of testimony on the subject would be helpful. Drone 
manufacturers – both those who have supplied drones to the armed services, and new 
entrants—federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies, potential operators, 
including those now in the ENG, pipeline and powerline patrol, and oil-and-gas 
exploration are pushing to accelerate drone use. Suppliers of wireless control systems, 
and DROP video displays see opportunities as well. Others, now at the margins, are 
commercial entities like Google that obviously could benefit from drone use for 
applications like Google Maps. 
Local groups and national privacy advocates are pushing back. The most prominent 
privacy groups, however, are not implacably opposed to drone deployment; they have 
a more nuanced position. Significantly, CBT appears to favor ENG drone use. It 
reserves its strongest concerns for abuse by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
V. Forecast 
As soon as the FAA relaxes further its COA201 and special-airworthiness-certificate202 
requirements for microdrones203—and maybe even before--the deployment of these 
small systems will proliferate. They will transform the way law-enforcement and 
newsgathering organizations use aviation support. It will make aviation support more 
affordable for police departments and journalists, may flood the newsgathering 
marketplace with amateur-recorded imagery, much as cell-phone-acquired imagery has 
                                                 
201  COAs (“Certificates of Authority”) are available only to federal, state, and local governments. 
202  Drones may be operated as civil aircraft only pursuant to special airworthiness certificates. 
203  sUAS is the formal designation for what this article calls microdrones. 
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already transformed it. It will stimulate demand for relatively low levels of training for 
a large cadre of qualified DROPs.204  
The timing and extent of use of microdrones will depend on the willingness of law-
enforcement agencies, TV stations, and utilities to try them out. Their prices and 
capabilities are well-established. How far their will spread will depend, of course, on 
early experience with them and the responses of police officers, reporters, and utility 
inspection crews who try them out. 
The development of machodrones will occur more slowly. They have essentially the 
same capabilities as manned helicopters, but stabilization of the regulatory regime will 
take another ten years. It is far from clear at this point that the weight and power-
consumption requirements of equipment necessary to ensure safe integration into the 
NAS will offer any particular advantage in price or operating cost over manned 
helicopters. Anticipated labor cost savings will be largely nullified by requirements that 
DROPs have the same basic qualifications and certifications as pilots and system 
operators for manned helicopters. 
Ultimately the revised FARs205 applicable to certification of drones and their operations 
may result in prices and operating costs that are less favorable than those for manned 
helicopters.  
The timing and extent of use for machodrones will depend mainly on cost and 
capabilities, influenced greatly by political reaction. They will used more widely for 
pipeline and powerline patrol than for law enforcement and newsgathering. This is so 
for several reasons: pipeline and powerline patrol can be carried out in remote areas, 
reducing political opposition; avoiding risks to flight crews is a bigger issue in 
powerline or pipeline patrol and repair; the finely tuned, ad hoc adjustments that 
                                                 
204  DROP-DRone OPerator: the person who flies the drone from a remote ground station 
DROSOP -DROne Systems Operator: the person who manages the drone’s sensors and other non-flight 
equipment, e.g. cameras, searchlights, video downlinks 
DROTOG -DROne phoTOG: a DSOSOP used in ENG 
DROTSO -DROne TSO: a DROSOP used in law enforcement support 
205  FAA regulations applicable to aviation operations usually are referred to as the “FARs” (“Federal 
Aviation Regulations”). 
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human pilots on board make is less for these applications than for law-enforcement and 
newsgathering. 
None of this will happen tomorrow. As this article is written (early 2014) drone use in 
the civilian sector is illegal, except under tightly restricted model-airplane rules that 
preclude commercial purposes, and under hard-to-obtain COAs and special 
airworthiness certificates.206 
The regulatory environment will evolve in three basic stages. The first is the present 
one, in which the FAA has sketched with reasonable specificity its basic intentions with 
respect to integration into the NAS, and is collecting and evaluating date from the six 
test sites. During this stage, however, drone use by either law enforcement or 
newsgathering organizations is illegal unless the users have special airworthiness 
certificates (for ENG or pipeline/powerline drones) or COAs (for law-enforcement 
drone operations).  
In the second stage (as early as the end of 2015, or as late as early 2018),207 general drone 
aircraft certification and operating rules will be on the books. That does not mean, 
however, that hundreds of drone operations will suddenly spring up. Instead, this will 
be a period of intense experimentation and market shakeout. Drone manufacturers will 
jockey to get airworthiness certificates for their products, new drone operators will 
apply for operating certificates under Part 135208  or a comparable new part of the FAR 
applicable to drones, and end-users will embark on various test programs either with 
their own certificated drones or by contracting with certificated operators. Pricing and 
operating costs will become clearer. 
During this period existing helicopter operators will decide whether they want to 
incorporate drones into their fleet or whether they will view them basically as a threat 
to their businesses. 
                                                 
206  See Busting Myths about the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, 
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240 (Feb. 26, 2014) (noting that only two special 
airworthiness certificates have been granted, both limited to Alaska, and lowering a 2011 FAA estimate of 
30,000 operational drones by 2030 to the area of greatest expected growth, projecting 7,500 microdrones 
by 2018). 
207  See § ___ (projecting timeline for FAA drone-integration rulemaking). 
208  Recall that ENG operations are exempt from Part 135 because they constitute “aerial photography. See 
note ___, infra. 
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Most would-be manufacturers will discover they do not have capital, expertise, or 
patience to get their products certificated and then to invest what is necessary to sell 
them in quantities and at prices that level that will cover their costs and generate a 
return on investment.  
Some end-user experiments will be successful, and these end-users will make 
substantial orders. Others will conclude, after their experimentation and tests that large-
scale drone use does not offer benefits proportionate to costs. If the past is any guide, 
most existing helicopter operators will view drones only as a threat; they will expect 
their market share to diminish as drones move-in to some of their territory. Others will 
make strategic decisions to offer mixed fleets, including drones, to their customers. 
The procedures for obtaining airworthiness certification will undoubtedly be divided 
by aircraft category, one, simplified, set for microdrones, and another, more 
demanding, set for machodrones. 
A number of manufacturers and service providers are gearing up to exploit the market 
for both microdrones and machodrones. Already, civilian microdrones are flying under 
COAs for a limited amount of law-enforcement support. As the FAA moves to a 
regulatory framework for microdrone flight, instead of requiring COAs or special 
airworthiness certificates in every case, the use of microdrones on an exploratory basis 
will explode. Not all of these uses will turn out to be viable. As with the development of 
any new market, initial enthusiasm will be moderated by experience, as supply and 
demand gradually settle down to what is sustainable. 
But it will be surprising if a number of microdrone uses like those sketched in this 
article do not prove to be viable. Therefore, by the end of 2018 or so, microdrones will 
regularly be flying missions for segments at the margin of pipeline, powerline, and 
railroad patrol, law-enforcement support, and ENG. Well before 2020, it is likely that a 
growing percentage of patrol officers will carry microdrones in the trunks of their 
squad cars and fly them to support localized tactical missions.209 Similarly, televisions 
stations will be unable to resist the temptation to use videos acquired from microdrones 
by ordinary citizens—just as the widespread broadcast of iPhone-captured video is a 
mainstay of journalism. For example, on Thursday, 13 February 2004, WBBM, the local 
                                                 
209  Aerobatic Solutions markets a microdrone, the Huntsman, very similar in weight an appearance to the 
Phantom for law-enforcement application. See http://www.aeroboticsolutions.com/products/. 
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CBS affiliate in Chicago featured a story about ice floes piling up on the southern shore 
of Lake Michigan, accompanying the report with video taken from a microdrone 
operated by the Indiana Department of Natural Resources.210 Channel 7 in Chicago 
solicits viewer videos.211 
Experimentation, especially with microdrones, will be decentralized. A particular police 
department or TV station—or more likely an individual police officer or reporter—will 
obtain possession of a drone and try it out. If success results, the word will spread and 
institutional interest will grow. If a negative incident occurs, the early, informal, 
adopter will get fired.212 
Existing helicopter operators may participate in early drone evaluation, or they may 
decline to participate, limiting themselves to manned helicopter operations. If they 
decline, their customers are likely to undertake drone testing and—in some cases—
drone deployment without involving the helicopter operators. 
Early experimentation and evaluation will go much more smoothly if it takes place in 
remote areas where almost no one lives, works, or plays. Public outcry is going to be 
much less in the country than in the city. 
Gradually, machodrones will find their way into law-enforcement and ENG fleets, but 
opponents will find it much easier to delay widespread use of machodrones than to 
block the proliferation of microdrones.. Their operations will be scrutinized, and 
inevitable accidents will provoke an outcry insisting on further restrictions. But then, at 
some point, a drone will find a lost child, and the political balance will tilt in the 
favorable direction. 
It is hard to block new technologies, however, especially when an objective review of 
the technologies show that they can deal—for the most part—with concerns about 
traffic separation and keeping machodrones in the air and away from people on the 
ground. The trick is figuring out what “for the most part” means. 
                                                 
210 The authors heard the story on the radio and watched the video clip on the web. It since has become 
unavailable, perhaps only to make room for more current news items. 
211  See http://abclocal.go.com/wls/feature?section=news/local&id=6549217 
212 See Draganfly—X4-ES First Look, Air Beat Magazine, Nov/Dec 2013 at 49 (describing successful 
experiments by Canadian and North Dakota agencies using a $25,000, 5.7 pound microdrone with a 1 km 
range and 20 minutes of endurance capable of flying Sony RS-100, Sony NEX5R Low Light, or FLIR Tau 
640 thermal imager). 
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Anyone who flies both airplanes and helicopters, as the authors do, knows that 
helicopters are considerably harder to fly than airplanes. Helicopters require constant 
control inputs to keep them level; airplanes do not. In calm air, a pilot can take his 
hands entirely off the yoke and throttle, and the airplane just purrs straight ahead. A 
helicopter pilot almost never takes his hand off the cyclic stick. If he does, the aircraft 
reminds him in a second or two that he better put it back. It is relatively easy to set off 
pilot-induced oscillations in a helicopter and quite difficult in an airplane. Helicopter 
autopilots have become available much later than airplane helicopter autopilots and 
full-functioned autopilots capable of flying departures and landing approaches are only 
just being introduced.  
Based on this experience it is counterintuitive to believe that rotary wing drones will 
have performance characteristics and safety features that put them at the leading edge 
of drone integration. Even if an engineer believes it, a pilot won’t. All an opposition 
group needs is one or two helicopter pilots to testify that drones are inherently unsafe, 
and they can block almost anything.  
Confidence on either side of the debate is misplaced. Who’s talking today about 
ordinary people flying their own helicopters from their driveways? 
The beast may be upon us, but it may all turn out, in the end, to have been merely a bad 
dream.  
